

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By Whom, all things; for Whom, all things.

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AMERICAN AGRICULTURE.

IT is proposed in this paper to take a general view of the characteristics of American agriculture. Ever since the revolt of the British colonies nullified the royal prohibition of the settlement of the Ohio valley, the frontier line of our population has been moving steadily westward, passing over one, two, and even three degrees of longitude in a decade, until now it rests at the base of the Rocky Mountains. The report of the Public Land Commission to Congress, just issued from the press, states that the amount of arable lands still remaining subject to occupation under the Homestead and Preëmption acts is barely sufficient to meet the demand of settlers for a year or two to come. This would seem a fitting point from which to review the course of American agriculture through the last hundred years; to inquire what have been its methods and what it has accomplished.

The subject may be treated under the following titles:

1. As to the tenure of the soil.

2. As to character of the cultivators as a class.

3. As to the freedom and fulness of experiment upon the relations of crops to climate and to local soils.

4. As to what has been done biologically to promote our agriculture.

5. As to what has been done mechanically.

6. As to what has been done chemically. Under which title we shall have occasion to explain the westward movement of the field of cultivation of wheat and corn and the southwestward movement of the cotton culture.

First. The tenure of land in the United States is highly popular. Throughout the Northern and Western States this has

always been so. The result has not been wholly due, as one is apt to think, to the existence of vast tracts of unoccupied land "at the West," whatever that phrase may at the time have meant, whether western New York in 1810, or Ohio in 1830, or Iowa in 1850, or Dacotah in 1880. An aristocratic holding of land in New England would have been quite as consistent with a great breadth of free lands across the Missouri as is such a holding of land in England consistent with the existence of boundless fertile tracts in Canada and Australia under the laws of the same empire.

The result in the United States has been due partly to the fact just noted, combined with the liberal policy of the government relative to the public domain; partly to excellent laws for the registration of titles and the transfer of real property in nearly every State of the Union; and partly to the genius of our people, their readiness to buy or to sell, to go east or to go west, as a profit may appear.

But while we have thus enjoyed a highly popular tenure of the soil, this has not been obtained by the force of laws compelling the subdivision of estates, as in France, under the law of "partible succession;"[1] nor has it been carried so far as to create a dull uniformity of petty holdings. If, as Prof. Roscher remarks, "a mingling of large, medium, and small properties, in which those of medium size predominate, is the most wholesome of political and economical organizations," the United States may claim to have the most favorable tenure of the soil among all the nations of earth. We have millions of farms just large enough to profitably employ the labor of the proprietor and his growing sons; while we have, also, multitudes of considerable estates upon which labor and moneyed capital, live-stock and improved machinery are employed under skilled direction; and we have, lastly, those vast farms, the wonder of the world, in Illinois and California, where 1000 or 5000 acres are sown as one field of wheat or corn, or, as on the Dalrymple Farms in Da-

[1] A strong reaction is manifest in France against the requirement of the code that all estates must, at the death of the proprietor, be equally divided among all the children. It is objected to as causing the subdivision of the land into patches too small for profitable cultivation, and as breaking up commercial and manufacturing establishments, rendering it a rare thing that a son should succeed his father in his business.

cotah, where a brigade of six-horse mowers go, twenty abreast, to cut the grain that waves before the eye almost to the horizon.

Whereas in France the number of estates is almost equal to the number of families engaged in agricultural pursuits, the number of separate farms with us is somewhat less than one half the number of persons actually engaged in agriculture, there being, on the average, perhaps 210 to 220 workers to each 100 farms.

At the South the institution of slavery, with the organization of labor and the social ideas carried along by slavery, generated and maintained a comparatively aristocratic tenure of the soil. The abolition of slavery, accomplished as it was by the violence of war, has not only created a new class desirous of acquiring land, but, by impoverishing the former masters, has brought no small proportion of the old plantations into the market, with the result that farms have been rapidly multiplied in this section. Since 1870 the number of farms in thirteen of the late slave States for which I have the statistics has increased 65 per cent; and this movement towards the subdivision of the large plantations is likely, in the absence of capital, to carry on extensive operations, to continue until the tenure of the soil shall be relatively even more popular than at the North. Mr. Edward Atkinson, an authority on the subject, holds that this minute subdivision of land will be peculiarly favorable to the cultivation of cotton.

Of the 3,800,000 farms, approximately, into which the cultivated area of the United States is divided, 60 or even 70 per cent are cultivated by their owners. In the Northern States the proportion rises to 80 per cent or even higher. Connecticut, Maine, and Massachusetts, of the New England States, and Wisconsin, Michigan, and Minnesota, of the Northwestern States, show an excess of 90 per cent. The rent of leased farms in New England is in a large majority of cases paid in money. In all other sections of the country rents are generally stipulated to be paid in some definite share of the produce, the proportion in many of the Southern and Western States being three, four, or five farms rented for shares of the produce to one for which a money rent is paid.

Second. Of the character of the cultivators of the soil in the United States it will not be necessary to speak at length. Con-

fining our view to the country north of the Potomac and the Ohio, we say that, unlike the cultivators in any country of Europe except Switzerland and perhaps Scotland, they have at no stage of our history constituted a peasantry in any proper sense of the term. The actual cultivators of the soil here have been the same kind of men precisely as those who filled the professions or were engaged in commercial and mechanical pursuits. Of two sons of the same mother one became a lawyer, perhaps a judge, or went down to the city and became a merchant, or gave himself to political affairs and became a governor or a member of Congress; the other stayed upon the ancestral homestead, or made a new one for himself and his children out of the public domain farther west, remaining through his life a plain, hard-working farmer.

Now this condition of things has made American to differ from European agriculture by a very wide interval. There is no other considerable country in the world where equal mental activity and alertness have been applied to the cultivation of the soil as to trade and so-called industry.

We have the less occasion to dwell now upon this theme, because we shall be called to note, under several heads following, striking illustrations of the effects of this cause in promoting the success of American agriculture.

And while the character of the native cultivators of the soil has been such as described, those who have come to us from foreign countries have caught the time and step and the spirit of the national movement with wonderful ease. As recruits received into an old regiment, with veterans behind, before, and on either side, with examples everywhere of the right way of doing things, and breathing an atmosphere surcharged with soldierly instincts, are soon scarcely to be distinguished from the heroes of ten campaigns, so the Germans, the Scandinavians, and, tho in a less degree, the Irish and French Canadians, who have made their homes where they are surrounded by the native agriculturists, have become in a short time almost as good Yankees, if not too near the frontier of settlement, as if they had been born upon the hills of Vermont.

While the cultivating class at the North has been as thus hastily characterized, at the South the soil was, until the war of

the rebellion, tilled by a race of blacks degraded and brutalized so far as is implied in a system of chattel slavery. Upon the fruits of their labor the master lived, either in luxury or in squalor, according to the number of those whose unpaid services he could command. The great majority of the slave-holding class lived far more meanly than ordinary mechanics at the North, or even than the common day-laborers among us.

Of the 384,000 slave-holders of 1860, 20 per cent owned but one slave each; 21 per cent more owned but two or three; those who owned five slaves or fewer comprised 55 per cent of the entire number; while 72 per cent had less than ten slaves, including men, women, and children. To the vast majority of this class slavery meant, simply and solely, shirking work; and to enjoy this blessed privilege they were content to live in miserable huts, eat the coarsest food, and wear their butternut-colored homespun. The slave worked just as little as he could, and just as poorly as he dared; ate everything on which he could lay his hands without having the lash laid on his back; and wasted and spoiled on every side, not from a malicious intention, but because he was ignorant, clumsy, and stupid, or at least stupefied. The master lived upon whatever he could wrest from laborers of this class. Of the planters with seven cabins or families of slaves, averaging five each, including house servants, aged invalids, and children, Mr. Fred. Law Olmstead, in his work on "The Cotton Kingdom," estimated the income "to be hardly more than that of a private of the New York metropolitan police force." Yet there were only about 20,000 slave-holders in 1860 who held slaves in excess of this number. Of these two or three thousand lived in something like state and splendor.

What the industrial outcome of the abolition of slavery will be it is yet too early to decide; but we already know that we are past the danger of "a second Jamaica," of which we had once a reasonable fear. The blacks are already under the impulse of their own wants, working better than they did beneath the lash, and those wants are likely to increase in number and intensity.

As to the poor whites of the South, I am disposed to believe that they are preparing for us a great surprise. We have been accustomed to think of them as brutalized by slavery till they

had become lazy, worthless, and vicious. Perhaps we shall find that the poor whites have been suppressed rather than degraded, and that beneath the hunting-fishing-lounging habit which slavery generated and maintained lies a native shrewdness almost passing Yankee wit, an indomitable pluck, such as has made the fights of Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg memorable forever in the history of mankind, and an energy which, when turned from horse-races, street-fights, cocking mains, hunting and fishing, to breaking up the ground, felling the forest, running the mill, exploiting the mine, and driving trade, may yet realize all the possibilities of that fair land.

Third. To ascertain what are the adaptations of any piece of ground to the cultivation of any single crop, and what variety and order of crops will best bring out the capabilities of soil and climate in the production of wealth, may seem a simple thing, but it is not. It is so far from being a simple thing that a race of men, not barbarous, but, as we call them, civilized, may inhabit a region for an indefinite period and this thing not be done at all. Such may be the lack of enterprise, such the force of tradition, that crops may be cultivated from generation to generation, and from century to century, while yet the question has never been fairly determined whether the agriculture of the district might not advantageously be reinforced, and the soil be relieved, by the introduction of new crops, or even by throwing out the traditionary crops altogether.

Gonzales in his "Tour of England" (1730) wrote: "And my tutor told me that a good author of their own made this remark of Wiltshire, 'that an ox left to himself would, of all England, choose to live in the north of this county, a sheep in the south part of it, and a man in the middle of both, as partaking of the pleasure of the plain and the plenty of the deep country.'" The remark does not exaggerate the nicety of those distinctions which determine the range of the profitable cultivation whether of an animal or a vegetable species. A certain rough canvass of the agricultural capabilities of any district is easily made, and a process of elimination early takes place by which certain crops are discarded, for once and for all, as hopeless. But among the great variety of crops which may be cultivated in any region, justly to discriminate between the good and the very good, and

to reject those which, tho within the "limit of tolerance," as the money-writers say, are yet on the whole, and in the long-run, not profitable, demands long, careful, and elaborate experimentation. Beyond this is the selection of varieties within the retained species, in which alone may reside the possibilities of success or failure; the fortunate choice of varieties, among the almost indefinite number, often making all the difference between profit and no profit.

To do this work satisfactorily requires great mental enterprise and what we may call curiosity, a natural delight in experimentation, a ready apprehension combined with persistency, in due measure, and with a sound judgment. To do this work both well and quickly, being neither slow in testing new and promising subjects, nor easily discouraged by the accidents which beset initiation and experiment, nor yet reluctant in drawing the proper inference from failure, would task the intellectual powers of any race of men.

In Europe the knowledge of soils and of climate, on which the cultivation of large estates or personal properties is based, is the accumulation of hundreds of years of experience. In the United States the course of settlement has called upon our people to occupy virgin territory as extensive as Switzerland, as England, as Italy, and latterly as France or Germany, every ten years. And it has been in meeting the necessity of a rapid, rough-and-ready reconnoissance of new soils under varying climatic conditions that the character of our cultivating class, as indicated under the previous title, has come most strikingly into play.

During the colonial period the work of experiment had so far advanced that every crop but one (sorghum) now recognized in the official agricultural statistics of the country was cultivated within the region east of the Alleghanies. In the long course of experiment which had resulted in the naturalization of the crops now so well known in New England, the following had, according to Prof. Brewer, been tried and rejected from our agriculture, viz., hemp, indigo, rice, cotton, madder, millet, spelt, lentils, and lucern.

But while so much of the adaptations of our general climate to agriculture had been thus early mastered, much in the way

of studying the agricultural capabilities of the infinite varieties of soil subject to this climate remained to be done within the region then occupied; while with every successive extension of the frontier of settlement the same work has had to be done for the new fields brought under cultivation. To say with what quick-wittedness and openness of vision, what intellectual audacity yet strong common-sense, what variety of resource and facility of expedients, what persistency yet pliancy, the American farmer has met this demand of the situation would sound like extravagant panegyric. No other agricultural population of the globe could have encountered such emergencies without suffering tenfold the degree of failure, loss, and distress which has attended the westward movement of our population during the past one hundred years.

Fourth. In asking what has been done biologically to promote American agriculture, we have reference to the application of the laws of vegetable and animal reproduction, as discovered by study and experiment, to the development of new varieties of plants and of animals, or to the perfection of individuals of existing varieties. In this department of effort the success of the American farmer has been truly wonderful, and our agriculture has profited by it in a degree which it would be difficult to overestimate. A few examples will suffice for our present occasion.

Receiving the running horse from England, we have so improved the strain that for the two years past, notwithstanding the unlimited expenditure upon racing studs in England, notwithstanding that English national pride is so much bound up in racing successes, and notwithstanding the grave disadvantages which attend the exportation of costly animals and their trial under the conditions of a strange climate, the honors of the British turf have been gathered, in a degree almost unknown in the history of British racing, by three American horses; and while Iroquois was last summer winning his unprecedented series of victories, two if not three American three-year-olds, generally believed to be better than Iroquois, were contesting the primacy at home.

The trotting horse we have created, certainly the most useful variety of the equine species, and we have improved that

variety in a degree unprecedented, I believe, in natural history. Two generations ago the trotting of a mile in 2 m. 40 sec. was so rare as to give rise to a proverbial phrase indicating something extraordinary; it is now a common occurrence. "But a few years ago," wrote Prof. Brewer in 1876, "the speed of a mile in 2.30 was unheard of; now perhaps five or six hundred horses are known to have trotted a mile in that time." The number is to-day perhaps nearer one thousand than five hundred. Steadily onward have American horse-raisers pressed the limit of mile-speed, till, within the last three seasons, the amazing figures 2.10 have been reached by one trotter and closely approached by another.

Take an even more surprising instance. About 1800 we began to import in considerable numbers the favorite English cattle, the short-horn. The first American short-horn herd-book was published in 1846. In 1873 a sale of short-horn cattle took place in western New York, at which a herd of 109 head were sold for a total sum of $382,000, one animal, a cow, bringing $40,600; another, a calf five months old, $27,000, both for the English market. To-day Devons and short-horns are freely exported from New York and Boston to England to improve the native stock.

In 1793 the first merino sheep, three in number, were introduced into this country, tho, unfortunately, the gentleman to whom they were consigned, not appreciating their peculiar excellencies, had them converted into mutton. Since that time American wool has become celebrated both for fineness of fibre and for weight of fleece. The finest fibre, by microscopic test, ever anywhere obtained, was clipped about 1850 from sheep bred in western Pennsylvania. More recently the attention of our wool-growers has been especially directed to increasing the quantity rather than to improving the quality of the wool.

Illustrations of the success of American agriculture, biologically, might be drawn from the vegetable kingdom, did space permit.

Fifth. To ask what has been done mechanically to promote our agriculture is to challenge a recital of the better half of the history of American invention. Remarkable as have been the mechanical achievements of our people in the department of

manufacturing industry, they have been exceeded in the production of agricultural implements and machinery, inasmuch as, in this branch of invention, a problem has been solved that does not present itself for solution, or only in a much easier shape, in those branches which relate to manufactures; the problem, namely, of combining strength and capability of endurance with great lightness of parts.

In no other important class of commercial products, except the American street carriage or field wagon, are these desired qualities so wonderfully joined as in the American agricultural machines, while the special difficulty arising from the necessity of repairs on the farm, far from shops where the services of skilled mechanics could be obtained, has been met by the extension to this branch of manufacture of the principle of interchangeable parts, a principle purely American in its origin. Through the adoption of this principle by the makers of agricultural machines, a farmer in the Willamette valley of Oregon is enabled to write to the manufacturer of his mower or reaper or thresher, naming the part that has been lost or become broken or otherwise useless, and to receive by return mail, third class, for which the government rate will be only two or three shillings, the lacking part, which, with a wrench and a screw-driver, he can fit into its proper place in fifteen minutes.

All the agricultural machines of to-day are not originally of American invention, altho most of them are, in every patentable feature; but I am not aware that there is at present in extensive use one which does not owe it to American ingenuity that it can be extensively used. Without the improvements it has received here, the best of foreign inventions in this department of machinery would have remained toys for exhibition at agricultural fairs, or machines only to be employed on large estates under favorable conditions.

But more, even, than the ingenuity of inventors and manufacturers has been required to give to agricultural machinery the wide introduction and the marvellously successful applications it has had in the cultivation of our staple crops east and west. "Experienced mechanicians," says Prof. Hearn, "assert that, notwithstanding the progress of machinery in agriculture, there is probably as much sound practical, labor-saving inven-

tion and machinery unused as there is used; and that it is unused solely in consequence of the ignorance and incompetency of the work-people." This remark, which is perfectly true of England, and the force of which would have to be multiplied fourfold in application to the peasantry of France or Austria, utterly fails of significance if applied to the United States. It is because mechanical insight and aptitude, in the degree respecting which the term, mechanical genius, may properly be used, are found throughout the mass of the American people that these products of invention and skill have been made of service on petty farms all over our land, and in the most remote districts wherever the divine rage of the pedler has carried him. Lack of mechanical insight and aptitude, in the full degree requisite for the economical use and care of delicate and complicated machinery, is almost unknown among our native northern people. Not one in ten but has the mechanical sense and skill necessary for the purpose.

But it has not been through the invention and wide application of agricultural machinery alone that the peculiar and extraordinary mechanical genius of our people has increased our national capacity for agricultural productions. In what we may call the daily commonplace use of this faculty, throughout what may termed the pioneer period and, in a diminishing degree, through each successive stage of settlement and industrial development, the American farmer has derived from this source an advantage beyond estimation in dealing with the perpetually varying exigencies of the occupation and cultivation of the soil.

Perhaps we cannot better illustrate this than by referring to a recent exhibition of our national activity in another field.

When the war of the rebellion broke out no one supposed that the American armies, hastily raised and commanded by men tried only in civil affairs, were to give lessons to the engineers of Europe. Yet, after our war had been going on about two years, it came to be apprehended that a new force had been introduced into warfare, causing an almost total revolution in field operations. The soldiers of the Union and Confederate armies, left almost to themselves in the matter, had gradually but rapidly developed a system of field intrenchments the like

of which had never been executed by any army or conceived by any engineer. Not only between night and morning, but often in the course of four or even three hours, was it found possible for infantry to cover their front with works adequate to a complete protection from musketry and from the casual fire of field-guns.

This system of intrenchment was a spontaneous, original creation on the part of many different bodies of troops. The officers who served most uninterruptedly through the campaigns of 1862 and 1863 could hardly presume to say when and where it first took distinct and recognizable shape. Those who have followed the course of military opinion in Europe and are familiar with the history of recent wars there know how greatly the theory and practice of field operations have been changed as a result of the introduction of the American system of rapid, rough-and-ready intrenchment. The works along the Rapidan, the Pamunkey, or the Appomattox were contemptible enough, viewed as finished products, irrespective of the time expended; but in the fact that such works could be thrown up in the interval between the arrival of the head and of the rear of a column, or in half a night, lay possibilities of almost infinite consequence to the strategist.

Now just what, in spirit, our soldiers were doing in 1863, '64, and '65 our farmers had been doing all through the pioneer period of every new State, and tho in a lower degree, in meeting the later and less pressing exigencies of agricultural extension and improvement. The way in which the pioneer of New England birth or blood, stopping his cattle in a wilderness, miles from any neighbor, and tumbling axe and spade, bundles and babies out upon the unbroken ground, which he was to make his home, set about the task of providing shelter for his children and his animals, clearing the ground and getting a first crop out of the soil, were not admirable merely as an exhibition of courage, faith, and enterprise, but, if we look at the results accomplished in the light of the time and labor expended, it constitutes a triumph of mechanical, we might say of engineering, genius.

The simple record of the first five years on a pioneer farm on the Western Reserve of Ohio, were it possible to set it forth in such a way that one could see that life in the wilderness lived

over again, that work in the wilderness done over again, would produce upon a mind capable of appreciating the highest human achievements a stronger impression of the intellectual power and originality of the American people than all the literature we have accumulated since Joel Barlow wrote his "Vision of Columbus."

Sixth. When we ask what has been done chemically to promote American agriculture, we reach at once the most characteristic differences between our cultivation of the soil and that prevailing in older countries; and we have, at the same time, the explanation of the contemptuous manner in which our agriculture is almost universally spoken of by European writers. Did I say contemptuous? The word, indignant, would often better express the feeling aroused in these writers by the contemplation of our dealing with the soil, which, from their point of view, they cannot but regard as wasteful, wanton earth-butchery. "In perusing the volumes of Messrs. Parkinson, Faux, Fearon, and others," says Hinton, in his History of the United States, "some hundred pages of invective occur because the Americans will persist in taking up fresh land instead of the more costly process of manuring a worn-out soil; will raise extensive crops instead of highly cultivating and beautifying a small space."

A few British tourists, indeed, notably Prof. Johnston and Mr. James Caird, have shown a somewhat juster appreciation of American agriculture; but even these have given only a qualified approval of our method of dealing with the soil, and have fallen ludicrously short of the truth in attempting to fix the limit of time during which this policy could be maintained.

Johnston, one of the best writers of his time on agricultural chemistry, publishing his "Notes on North America" in 1851, expressed his belief that the exportable wheat of the continent, as a whole, was "already a diminishing quantity." In the light of to-day the following reads somewhat strangely:

"It is fair and reasonable, therefore, I think, to conclude, until we have better data, that the wheat-exporting capabilities of the United States are not so great as they have by many in Great Britain hitherto been supposed; that they have been overstated on the spot, and that our wheat-growers at home have

been unduly alarmed by these distant thunders, the supposed prelude of an imaginary torrent of American wheat, which was to overwhelm everything in Great Britain, involving farmers and landlords in one common ruin."

Undue alarm; distant thunders; supposed prelude; imaginary torrent! Nothing so good as that had been said since the profane scoffer told the son of Lamech to go along with his old ark; it wasn't going to be much of a shower, after all.

What, then, has been this American way of dealing with the soil to which our English brethren have so strongly made objection?

The American people finding themselves on a continent containing an almost limitless breadth of arable land, of fair average fertility, having little accumulated capital and many urgent occasions for every unit of labor power they could exert, have elected—and in doing so they are, I make bold to say, fully justified, on sound economical principles—to regard the land as practically of no value and labor as of high value; have, in pursuance of this theory of the case, systematically cropped their fields, on the principle of obtaining the largest crops with the least expenditure of labor, limiting their improvements to what was required for the immediate purpose specified, and caring little about returning to the soil any equivalent for the properties taken from it by the crops of each successive year. What has been returned has been only the manure generated incidentally to the support of the live-stock needed to work the farm. In that which is for the time the great wheat and corn region of the United States the fields are, as a rule, cropped continuously, without fertilization, year after year, decade after decade, until their fertility sensibly declines.

Decline under this regimen it must, sooner or later, later or sooner, according to the crop and according to degree of original strength in the soil. Resort must then be had to new fields of virgin freshness, which with us in the United States has always meant "the West." When Prof. Wharton wrote, the granary of the continent had already moved from the flats of the lower St. Lawrence to the Mississippi valley, the north and south line which divided the wheat product of the United States into two equal parts being approximately the line of the

82d meridian. In 1860 it was the 85th; in 1870, the 88th; in 1880, the 89th.

Meanwhile what becomes of the regions over which this shadow of partial exhaustion passes, like an eclipse, in its westward movement? The answer is to be read in the condition of New England to-day. A part of the agricultural population is maintained in raising upon limited soils the smaller crops, garden vegetables and orchard fruits, and producing butter, milk, poultry, and eggs for the supply of the cities and manufacturing towns which had their origin in the flourishing days of agriculture, which have grown with the age of the communities in which they were planted, and which, having been well founded when the decadence of agriculture begins, flourish the more on this account, inasmuch as a second part of the agricultural population, not choosing to follow the westward movement of the grain culture, are ready with their rising sons and daughters to enter the mill and factory.

Still another part of the agricultural population gradually becomes occupied in the higher and more careful culture of the cereal crops on the better portion of the former breadth of arable land, the less eligible fields being allowed to spring up in brush and wood; deeper ploughing and better drainage are resorted to; fertilizers are now employed to bring up and to keep up the pristine fertility of the soil.

And thus begins the serious systematic agriculture of an old State. Something is done in wheat, but not much. New York raised thirteen million bushels in 1850; thirty years later, when her population had increased seventy per cent, she raises thirteen million bushels. Pennsylvania raised fifteen and a half million bushels in 1850, with a population of two and a quarter millions; in 1880, with four and a half million inhabitants, she raises nineteen and a half million bushels. New Jersey raised 1,600,000 bushels then; she raises 1,900,000 now.

More is done in corn, that magnificent and most prolific cereal; more still in buckwheat, barley, oats, and rye. Pennsylvania, tho the tenth State in wheat production, stands first of all the Union in rye, second in buckwheat, and third in oats; New York, the same New York whose Mohawk and Genesee valleys were a proverb through the world forty years ago, is but

the thirteenth State in wheat, but is first in buckwheat, second in barley, and third in rye.

It is in the way described that Americans have dealt with the soil opened to them by treaty or by purchase. And I have no hesitation in saying that posterity will decide, first, that it was both economically justified and politically fortunate that this should be done; and, secondly, that what has been done was accomplished with singular enterprise, prudence, patience, intelligence, and skill.

It will appear, from what has been said under the preceding titles, that I entertain a somewhat exalted opinion concerning American agriculture. Indeed, I do. To me the achievements of those who in this new land have dealt with the soil, under the conditions so hurriedly and imperfectly recited, surpass the achievements of mankind in any other field of economic effort. With the labor power and capital power which we have had to expend during the past one hundred years, to have taken from the ground these hundreds, these thousands of millions of tons of food, fibres, and fuel for man's uses, leaving the soil no more exhausted than we find it to-day; and, meantime, to have built up, out of the current profits of this primitive agriculture, such a stupendous fund of permanent improvements, in provision for future needs and in preparation for a more advanced industry and a higher tillage: this certainly seems to be not only beyond the achievement, but beyond the power, of any other race of men.

FRANCIS A. WALKER.

RIGHT AND WRONG IN POLITICS.

THERE is no serious thinker at the present day who, if pointedly questioned, would deny the applicability of the terms *Right*, *Wrong*, *Duty*, *Conscience*, *Morality* and *Immorality* to the conduct of states and governments as well as to that of individual men and women. It is true, indeed, that if these terms are used loosely and thoughtlessly enough in pronouncing on the conduct of private persons, where the problem, if any, is tolerably simple in its elements, and most of the conditions of it capable of being ascertained and reduced to a certainty, in the larger political field the inquiry is highly complicated, and large classes of the most essential facts are wholly out of the reach of the judicial investigator. Nevertheless it is manifest that in all quarters in which public criticism resides—whether in the newspaper press, the more labored and deliberate magazine, the election hustings, or the political text-book—the rightness or wrongness of the acts of legislatures or administrators is brought to the bar of a strict public opinion with quite as much decision and explicitness as the expediency or prudence of the same acts. This use of language is at all events a testimony to the existence of a widely diffused consciousness that states and governments have no immaculate conception. The fact is, indeed, so obvious when thus stated, that it is almost forgotten how wholly absent from the ante-Christian theory and practice of politics in all Western communities was the notion of a purely moral standard of action, and that perhaps Christianity has triumphed almost as signally in moralizing secular politics as in spiritualizing individual and domestic life. The readers of Coleridge's lay sermon on "The Bible the Statesman's Manual," as well as of the late Professor Maurice's "Prophets and Kings of

Old Testament History," will recall with satisfaction the lesson nowhere more effectually taught than in the writings of these authors, that the Bible has had an almost incalculable influence in swaying political judgments, that it was providentially intended to have that influence, and that political judgments for all time can never escape from a referential obligation to the immutable principles pre-eminently, if not exclusively, revealed to the Jewish Church.

In spite of these incontestable facts, there is a difference of some importance and magnitude between the ethical standard and even the ethical motive when applied to vast communities consisting of an indefinite and indiscriminate number of individual persons organized for the ends implied in the complex notion conveyed by the term *State*, and when applied to the individual life of private persons. It is obvious, for instance, that in a despotically governed community, where the king or emperor is above the law, and makes the law as he will and executes it when and how he pleases, the rightness and wrongness of the acts of state are in fact synonymous with the rightness and wrongness of the autocrat's acts, and the critical problem is reduced to the same mode of determination as in ordinary judgments on the acts of private men. But where the government is of a more complex kind, or perhaps of an extremely complex kind—depending, say, in the case of each of its acts, on a concert of chambers, of representatives, and of various executive authorities, there being much discussion and finally broad divisions of opinion—the unity of conduct seems to be so disturbed or confused as almost to exclude the idea of moral responsibility as residing anywhere in the nation at large. Considering that the tendency of modern times is certainly in the direction of an increase of complication in the machinery of government, partly on account of an access of intricacy in the concerns to be provided for, partly on account of a higher susceptibility to the claims of distributive justice, it would be a most grave conclusion to arrive at, that moral judgments were to be paralyzed just at the moment when they need to be quickened into more active life. Fortunately, experience is the other way; and there is no doubt that the very same causes which have made modern political constitutions intricate in their structure,

and perhaps somewhat slow and cumbrous in their action, have vitalized the moral energy of the critical public everywhere, and are compelling governments to comply with a purely moral standard of action to an extent which even a hundred years ago, and, *a fortiori*, in pagan times, would have seemed to the moralist a mere gorgeous dream.

M. Renan[1] has recently pointed out, with a force which he might have borrowed from some of the most orthodox modern Christian apologists, that the interval of the Roman Empire was in fact an interpolation of a cosmopolitan and denationalized society between the intensely patriotic worlds of the Roman and Greek republics and those of the modern European states.

M. Renan and the Christian apologists place very different interpretations on the phenomenon they combine to illustrate. Whether this interval was a merely human cause of the growth of Christianity, or was a divine and necessary preparation for it, there is no question but that as the new Christian states arose an ethical element was found to be indissolubly bound up with them, for which no place was found in republican Rome or even in philosophical Greece. Mr. Ward, in his "History of the Law of Nations," has attributed much direct influence on the growth of international morality first to the Councils of the Church and then to the action of the Papacy. But, apart from the direct operation on such matters as the observance of treaties, the treatment of prisoners of war, the restriction of private wars, the observance of the "truce of God," and the censure of the private lives of rulers, there was a far greater tho long-hidden change manifesting itself in the nature of the standard to which a final public appeal was made. The Christians from the orthodox south met the Arian Christians of the north, and, amidst all the clinging barbarism, the crass inconsistencies, the individual outrages manifest everywhere, the name of God and the supreme obligation of a moral law occupy a place in the thoughts of the soldier, the colonist, the serf, the barbarian chief, and the popular assembly which was a wholly novel acquisition of the growing world. The story from that time to this is indeed a checkered one; and during it the seed

[1] Hibbert Lectures.

of the moral life has been hidden, sometimes for generations together, in the cell of the monk; or wasted in the untimely visions and utterances of the fanatical enthusiast; or religious wars have seemed to drown in blood the precious inheritance for which they were waged; or violent persecutions have simulated the portents of heathendom: till at last there dawns some hope that the nations of the West are to have free course, with all the gains and with all the help of finely adjusted moral criticism for which they have so long struggled and waited. Of course in these remarks it is not intended to depreciate the aspirations and criticisms of such of the nobler spirits of old as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Plutarch; nor still less—to deny that motives of the most purely ethical kind were all along determining, however unconsciously, the action of statesmen and the lives of patriot citizens. It is only alleged that the conscious application of a moral test in the region of politics not by a few of the more highly-trained minds, but by the general and intuitive apprehensions of the multitude at large, is a growth and attainment coeval with the appearance of what may be characteristically called Christian states.

The application of an ethical standard and motive to politics sheds an instructive light on the curious fortunes of modern utilitarianism, and when properly considered is capable of helping forward the solution of the problem to which the existence of that theory owes its rise. Modern utilitarianism reached its fullest or only logical development in the person of Jeremy Bentham. It has indeed had a history since his time to which the late Mr. John Stuart Mill has largely contributed. But in the countless modifications and explanations which have attended it, it has lost what at its first birth and mature growth was its chief recommendation—the excellence of simplicity and consistency. In the last chapter of his treatise on "Early Institutions," Sir Henry Sumner Maine has drawn attention to the fact that Jeremy Bentham was a legislator more than anything beside; and his taste and genius as a legislator determined his habits of thought on all subjects whatever. But at the best legislation is, on one side of it, a rough practical remedy for the evils of the world. Each person legislated for, counts as one and no more·

And between two alternative remedial processes, that generally has to be preferred which benefits more persons before another which benefits fewer. Bentham's celebrated treatise on "Morals and Legislation" is nothing more than a logical expansion of this principle and its application to the whole field of human life. The legislator transforms himself into the moralist, and he brings with him into the new universe he has invaded no other implements and mechanism than the coarse materials which fully sufficed him for his previous work.

It needed but a superficial criticism to show that, whereas such an idea as that of happiness, or rather the restriction of pain, has an intelligible meaning for the political reformer, it is far too impalpable and indefinite to be of the slightest service in indicating the aim and standard of all moral acts. The measurement, again, of this happiness, and the calculation of the number of persons who may be affected by any specific scheme devised for imparting it, again imply materialistic conceptions of number, quantity, and weight, which, in connection with the thoughts and feelings as well as the singular phenomenon of conscience, with which morality is alone concerned, are singularly irrelevant and inappropriate. Nevertheless it has been well pointed out that the opponents of utilitarianism have afforded a handle to their adversaries by ignoring or appearing to ignore the truly materialistic and calculable elements that often must enter into moral acts. There are many cases in which the moral agent who is scrupulously desirous of conforming to the dictates of conscience must balance the claims of diverse alternative duties by reference to the number of persons whose interests may be affected according as one course or the other is adopted, or by the degree, quality, or quantity, of the interest which is at stake. The late Professor Grote, brother of the historian of Greece, in his exhaustive "Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy," was among the first opponents of that philosophy who, by recognizing the real utilitarian element, which is inseparable from any complete moral theory, has done more to close the controversy forever than any other writer in the same field.

Now it is undoubtedly in the world of politics that whatever utilitarian element really belongs to a science of abstract moral-

ity will be pre-eminently found. Mr. John Austin, indeed, was so impressed with this fact, and so desirous of reconciling the teaching he derived from Bentham with the promptings of a reverential view of Divine Providence, that he based his utilitarian structure on a theocratic foundation. God loves all his creatures, argues Mr. Austin, and designs for them the utmost happiness possible in their mundane circumstances; in fact, the greatest happiness of the greatest number of all members of the sentient creation. By an inversion of this thought, Mr. Austin holds himself entitled to conclude that if the happiness can be weighed, and the number of persons affected counted, the arithmetical elements would be provided for ascertaining in any given case the will of God and the path of duty. Unfortunately there are in the ethical regions products which are less ponderable even than pleasure, and as heathenism certainly failed to regenerate the world by the law of competition, it is still being seen whether Christianity has done or can do more for it by the law of sacrifice.

As an instance of the curious transmutations which moral ideas and terms properly undergo when transferred from the life of individual men to the existence of the state—or rather from the lives of men in a non-political to the lives of men in a political aspect—there will at once recur to the memory the persistent problems as to whether and under what conditions patriotism, ambition, national rivalries or antipathies, are virtues or vices. It would be said at once that it depends on the circumstances; that what is a virtue up to a certain point becomes a vice if practised beyond that point, and that the fact that the state is the object of action cannot really alter moral estimates from what they would be if smaller and more insignificant corporations were alone concerned. And yet this is not exactly so. It is felt at once that for a man to devote the whole of his energies towards advancing the material interests or even the safety of a narrow circle with which he is identified—be it his family, his clan, his club, his village, or his political party—scarcely differs as a matter for moral evaluation from an entire devotion of a man's life to what is in the narrowest sense himself. Not, indeed, that the moralist will forget that some of the hardest and most perplexing duties and those least well remunerated, being

inward rather than outward, may be said, however fallaciously, to be performed solely in reference to himself. In this sense the constantly extending groups of his fellow-creatures with whom he comes into relation during his earthly life represent only an ever-enlarging and enriched self. He may be called upon at different epochs to consecrate himself wholly to one or other of these groups, or he may run in advance of his duty—and so really lag behind it—by preferring at the wrong time and place the claims of one group over those of another. These claims cannot be measured nor adjusted by any rude appreciation of the numbers of persons affected or of direct effects of conduct. He may need a lifetime of cultivated moral sagacity to determine rightly and justly, and no bare rules or recorded experience of others can do more than supply him with principles or stimulate him by example.

But when the transition is made from all the smaller societies to that of the state, the moral atmosphere seems to have undergone a transformation and old things to have become new. Duties which were relative become absolute. Actions which were or seemed partly virtuous and partly vicious are exposed in their true colors to the light of day. The whole judgments of mankind seem to have become concentrated and enlightened, and the experience of the race to be laid under tribute for the purpose of clearing moral action and propagating throughout society straightforward and perspicuous popular sentiments. *Cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiares; sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est; pro quâ quis bonus dubitet oppetere mortem si ei sit profuturus.* In such sentiments as these are gathered up a world-history of philosophy, which has been not only filtered into popular truisms, but transfused into the most inexpugnable of emotions and aspirations. It is believed to be right to make sacrifices for the state which no other cause—scarcely even the interests of a man's self and his home—could justify. If it is asked why a state or nation differs beyond possible comparison in the dignity and authority of the claims which it makes on the individual human component of it from what is made in the case of any other or smaller organization, or even by a wider organization, such as an empire (that is a levelled assemblage of divers nations or states), it can only be

answered that the state occupies in the constitution of the world a position *sui generis*, and to which there is nothing which presents any exact resemblance or analogy. So far as our knowledge extends, it is in the life of the state, and only there, that human life, in all its ramifications, can obtain the nourishment it needs for its appropriate expansion and development. This is equally true, indeed, of the family, and we believe it to be true of some still higher and less materially constituted society which, amidst all the limitless interpretations which have been placed upon the name, still retains for Christians the profoundest significance—that is, the Church. Each of these organizations has an essential contribution to make to the perfection of human society and to the perfection of individual life in that society. Both lay claim to the devout allegiance, within proper limits, of the persons who compose it; and each, on the other hand, owes to those persons the maintenance of its own peculiar character and the faithful discharge of its tutelary duties.

It is thus that the largest-minded heathen philosophers, such as Aristotle and Cicero, discerned that in a life of public activity on behalf of the state something more was concerned than the accomplishment of narrow personal aspirations. In the same way, even with all the refinements of modern ethical criticism, it is intuitively felt that the self-seeking of such men as Henry VIII. of England, Frederick the Great of Prussia, and even of Napoleon Bonaparte, has to be submitted to a very different, tho perhaps not more indulgent, ordeal from that which is applicable to ordinary men acting in a more circumscribed area. The root of this feeling is, no doubt, a true consciousness that the mere contact with state affairs, and the lively apprehension it carries with it of the innumerable and lasting interests which the conduct of a single man affects, has of itself a sobering influence, which, by dwarfing into insignificance all mere personal cravings, forces even the most narrow minds into a certain largeness of action which suggests a dominant sense of accountability to something other and better than a temporary and vacillating public opinion.

The faults of this moral inquisition as applied in the pagan world were due in a large degree to the constitution of the pre-Christian states, in which a slave population vastly exceeded in

numbers the population of enfranchised citizens. The result was that even the most scrutinizing philosophers had no types presented to their eyes or their memories of phases of society in which common civic virtues and still more prominent civic excellences were demanded of more than a limited fraction of all the persons in the state.. Thus attention was fixed far more on the signal examples either of virtue or vice in individual citizens of note, than on the general standard of public self-renunciation to which even the humblest and most indigent citizen would, according to a modern standard, be expected to attain. Another cause of this altered spirit of criticism is to be found in what is sometimes regarded as the greater gravity of modern life as contrasted with ancient, but which is really the expression in the world of politics of the ideas of individual conscience, of duty, of right, and of wrong, to which the training of eighteen Christian centuries has, with all its terrible drawbacks, given such a magnificent extension. In the older world duties were distinct, separate, manifold, and, as it were, dislocated. There was no tie to bind them together, and none to explain the connection which the duties of one person, or of one class of persons, in a community had with duties of a different kind elsewhere. Thus the duties of a man to his country were artificially contrasted with duties to his family, to himself, or to mankind at large, and any impetus that might be given to one order of these duties simply terminated there without diffusing any fresh light or heat beyond itself. The essence of Christian civilization and of morality, on the other hand, is the imparting to all duties a mutual connection, and further linking every group of duties on to a comprehensive and unique spirit of obligation and self-devotion in the harmonious oneness of which the commonest uses are strengthened and quickened by alliance with all the rest. Hence, when once it came to be recognized in modern consciousness that a man owed a duty to his country, and could commit a sin by neglecting this duty, the duty in question was instantly enforced by all the sacred and persuasive sanctions by which the whole of the reformed society was kept together.

It will be well at this point to remark upon a few of the concrete

manifestations of this change of moral attitude. Instances are supplied by the familiar moral formulæ now universally adopted as defining the duties of individual citizens in respect of (1) frauds on the revenue, (2) corruption at elections, (3) revolution.

1. The prevention of the class of offences to which smuggling and false returns to taxing assessments belongs, might be expected to be easier in modern communities into the government of which the idea of representation enters so largely, than in states in which the governors and the governed were for almost all purposes polar opposites. Yet the extension of the range of modern government from that of the city to the aggregate of cities and landed territory composing the modern state-unit, has of itself, apart from the mere growth of moral ideas, introduced a new class of difficulties in the application of common morality to the relations of a taxpayer and his government. The smaller and more concentrated the state system, the more nearly does it approach, in the popular apprehension, a purely communistic society, in which the end of the organization is understood by everybody concerned; in which the supports derivable from a clear and uniform public opinion are of the strongest; and in which the loss occasioned by individual defaulters is most obviously connected with the undue burdening of all other persons in the community. In the present day the financial machinery of states, complicated and magnified as it is by enormous public debts, has attained to a portentous size and breadth which in other ages would have seemed scarcely compatible with the continued existence of a state. But the productive resources and the extension of commerce by land and sea could also never have been foreseen. The general effect, however, is that such taxation as there is, is spread over almost innumerable classes and orders of persons, none of whom are exempt, none (theoretically) unduly burdened, and no one subjected to exactly the same amount of pressure as another. Thus where legal contrivances for detecting evasions fail, as little help as possible is provided by a rigorous and keen-sighted tribunal of public opinion. Every one knows that, if he were the only defaulter, the loss to the state and the access of burden to other persons would be incalculably small. Every one also, when arguing with himself in his own cause, is too prone to adopt a

sophistical suggestion that a self-governing community leaves to private citizens a greater license of doing as they like—that is, not being governed at all, and consequently being governed at their neighbors' expense—than is granted in communities less popularly governed. Hence, what with the privacy which the very extent of the taxing operations involves, the unequal incidence of the taxes, the impotence of executive organizations for buoying up the popular conscience, a sentiment too easily grows up and is rapidly diffused which is inimical to stern convictions of the treachery to the state and the real moral turpitude and shameless cowardice which is involved in evading the discharge of money debts to the state. Such a sentiment is in fact one of the deepest political heresy, or rather amounts to political infidelity. It is one thing openly to refuse to pay a particular tax in the spirit, say, of John Hampden, or even, as some persons have done even in England of late, to take the first step in revolution by refusing to pay all taxes, on the ground of dissatisfaction with the representative system, or with the conduct of the government. It is quite another thing to continue openly to draw all the advantages of civic concert and to breathe the air of a richly charged national life, and yet at the same time to turn to private account the necessarily infirm efforts of the state to grapple with its inherent perplexities and to batten in secret over prey—however small—filched from the common treasury. There is growing up on every side a far higher morality than heretofore with respect to the relations of a private citizen to the state on its financial side; and if scandalously lax doctrines still prevail in many quarters, this is mainly owing to the greater rate at which modern states have grown in population, in territorial extent, and in financial liability, than in an ethical intelligence adequate to meet the new demands upon it.

(2) Some of the same reasoning and the same historical consideration applies to the case of bribery and electoral corruption. The case here is no doubt a somewhat more complex one, inasmuch as the possibilities of wrong-doing in the matter of giving a vote by no means stop at the point of merely refusing a pecuniary payment for it, but travel through the whole scale of unworthy motives up to those which are just short of an ideal

and scrupulous conscientiousness. In some countries—as in England, for instance—the very structure of the state has almost inevitably connected a base personal interest with the discharge of the highest representative functions. Under the nomination-borough system, which prevailed before the English Reform Act of 1832, it was almost inevitable that the right to send and therefore to choose a member of Parliament was, in the popular consciousness, an essential ingredient in the aggregate of property rights vested in the local potentate whose will determined the election. So soon as these boroughs were abolished, it might well have seemed that the new constituencies were the universal "heirs" for electoral purposes of the aristocracy whose place they took. This dangerous and confusing notion is even still supported by the anomalous circumstance that Peers of Parliament are constitutionally and legally entitled to make monetary contracts with railway companies in respect of their vote for or against a proposed railway scheme before the House of Lords. They are not held to be representatives of the public, and on behalf of the interests of themselves and their families they may do what they choose. Thus, just after the passing of the Reform Act of 1832, it is probable that not only did corruption reach its highest point in England, but the popular conscience in respect of it was at its weakest. The great extension, however, of the suffrage has been gradually working its own cure, and the House of Commons has only reflected, however tardily, the promptings of the national conscience by the improved machinery for trying imputations of bribery by a judicial process, closely resembling that of a criminal trial, conducted on the spot by one of the judges of the High Court of Judicature, and by the institution of the ballot. As to this last institution, indeed, some controversy has taken place among critical moralists as to its direct and indirect bearing on the public sense of honor and of political responsibility. It has been said that giving a vote is the discharge of a trust, and that every trust ought to be discharged openly and courageously. To shelter a voter from the consequence of his vote is said to be merely nursing him in habits of political timidity, not to say cowardice. This reasoning, however, is certainly opposed to the universal experience of the action of the ballot in the

United States, in the British Colonies, and in Great Britain itself during the seven years in which it has already been in operation. The relief which the ballot secures from immediate and surrounding pressure, or rather intrusiveness of all sorts, and the quiet and decent order thereby secured for the performance of the most solemn and deliberate of all political functions, constitute an almost priceless boon. The ballot need not of itself involve any concealment of a voter's political character, intentions, or acts. All it does is to prevent the forcible exposure of a political act to the eyes of persons who have no claim whatever to be acquainted with it, and still less to control it.

If the only sort of corruption which had to be denounced were that which takes a directly pecuniary form, there would be a fair prospect of it shortly becoming an anachronism. Experience, however, has been showing of late years that one of the main difficulties which popular government, especially when extended over a wide area, has to contend with is due to corruption of a less palpable kind, and one which, on the face of it, less easily falls within the reach of moral obloquy. The individual voter in the smaller constituencies, or the more remote districts of a country, cannot but have all sorts of private interests of himself, his family, his township, or even his religious sect to serve by returning one candidate to the legislature rather than another. It is difficult to say that it is in all cases base to give a preponderance of weight to one or other of these interests as contrasted with the whole claims of the state, which are, perhaps, very imperfectly known, and still less duly estimated at their due value. To give just the right degree of regard to the narrower interest, which ought not to be wholly neglected, and to the wider interest, which ought to be of supreme concern, requires a finely-cultured conscientiousness, which can only be the growth of long and arduous national training, and indeed of individual education. It is none the less proper, however, to denounce in the strongest terms the more flagrant kinds of preferential regard for private over public, and for local over national objects in the selection of members of the legislature. It does not seem possible in such countries as England, with its antiquated traditions the other way, and the United States, with its federal system and its enormous

area, to dispense with the prominence of the local and territorial element in representation. Efforts, indeed, have been made by some such machinery as Mr. Hare's method of proportional representation to add the minorities together over a considerable district, and so, among other advantages, to reduce the openings for corruption. But the primary basis of the representative system, especially in widely-scattered territories, will probably always be local; and therefore the best securities against corruption must be looked for in a quickened sensibility to the true relations of near and distant demands, and to penetrating conscientiousness in preferring, on proper occasions, the general to the more particular interest.

(3) The moral duties of citizens in respect to revolution have at all times opened out an unbounded field of debate. The opinions of most persons are colored by reference to some recent experience either of their own, or their own nation, or their own times; and in proportion to the gravity of the subject is the heat of the passion with which the discussion of it is usually approached. In Europe, indeed, it happens that for the last two hundred years the breaking up of the pretty uniformly distributed pressure of the feudal system has been attended by a series of revolutions of an almost uniformly and obviously beneficial character in each of the European states. The experience of America has been of a more ambiguous kind. Enough, however, has happened to range on the whole the friends of political progress with the advocates of the extreme rights of revolutionists, and in their eyes to erect the right of revolution into almost as dignified a position as was once occupied by the "right divine of kings to govern wrong." And yet if the modern politician could find time to ponder at leisure on the history of the last hundred and fifty years of the Roman republic, he would learn that there are states of society in which there may prevail a facility of creating a revolution—now by the help of the mob, now by that of a professional soldiery, which may constitute at once the most tempting seduction to an unconscientious citizen, and become the main peril to the stability of any government at all. Bad and reckless as was the Roman Government at the beginning of the time alluded to, and flagrant as were the breaches in the constitution habitually

made by the constitutional authorities themselves, still the first violent occupation by Sulla of Rome with an armed force for the purpose, indeed, of maintaining or restoring formal order, marks the moment from which the true constitutional reparation of Rome became forever impossible. Probably, indeed, the actual revolution perpetrated by Sulla was rendered unavoidable by preceding constitutional events, including the innovations of the Gracchi, and the choice was only between the permanent rule of successful soldiers and the intermittent despotism of street mobs led by capitalists.

Such memories are wholesome as checks on any predisposition to glorify a revolutionary spirit as being synonymous with patriotism. The problem was, of course, a very different one in the England of Charles I., James II., and even of William IV., and still more different in the America of 1776. But the advent of popular government in almost all modern states, and the broadening of constituencies and the progressive lowering of the franchise which it involves, introduce problems of an entirely novel class so far as the presumption of right in favor of revolutions is concerned. It is generally admitted in theory that either actual success, or legitimate grounds for anticipating success, are the very least among the many conditions which are demanded as furnishing an apology for incurring the frightful risk which the breaking up of a political order, made up of the most complex elements, and only achieved, perhaps, after centuries of effort, necessarily involves. When popular government is completely established, it rests with the people themselves—*ex hypothesi*—to control the action of the executive, to determine the policy to be pursued by the legislature, and, if necessary, to recast entirely the formal mechanism which is interposed between the popular will and its interpretation in action—that is, to reform the constitution. It may not be able to do any of these things in a day, and from personal and accidental causes the impediments to the full exertion of the popular force may be greater at one time than at another. But after a sufficient interval has elapsed for bringing the public mind to bear on a subject requiring attention or a defect requiring amendment, and after full discussion has taken place, and the legitimate influences of all sorts have sufficiently played upon

and counteracted each other, there does arrive a moment at which it may be truly said that people have come to a definite determination, and know their own mind. It is the part of a good citizen, who is possessed by even the most frenzied eagerness for achieving some particular political improvement, to attain his object by a legitimate use of the multiform means legitimately at his disposal. He will do his utmost to bring the world—that is, the ultimately effective portion of the whole body-politic—round to his views; he will resort, it may be, to all the instrumentality of the public platform, the public press, and of what is implied in the right of association and combination. It is not till every one of these resources has been tried and has failed that the question can so much as present itself as to the comparative duties of a citizen to acquiesce, for the sake of order, in a hopelessly bad state of things, and that of encountering the certainty of present disorder, with the possibility of bringing about a catastrophe involving good and evil alike, in pursuit of a good not otherwise, if at all, to be attained. The plea for revolution in a popularly constituted state must rest on the allegation of there being some accidental obstruction to the free action of the popular will. This obstruction may be owing to the preponderant and maliciously exercised influence of some individual person or group of persons, who, by the existing forms of the constitution, happen to be placed out of the reach of popular control; or it may be due to the unexpected failure of some check or balance wheel which time and circumstances have rendered futile; or, again, it may be due to a deliberate conspiracy in some quarter or other by which the forms of the constitution are complied with, while its spirit is perverted or treacherously invaded. Even in such contingencies as these, recent examples, of which France at the close of Marshal MacMahon's Presidentship was a signal specimen, have shown that there may be an outlet for the reassertion of the true popular will short of either mob or military violence. Anyway, it is a crime of the deepest dye for any man or assemblage of men to contemplate revolution, so long as remedies may still presumably be found either within the normal range of constitutional action or by means of popular amendments of the constitution conducted after a regular and orderly fashion. Not,

indeed, that severe and scrupulous limits can be assigned to the excitement and even ebullient fury which are likely to accompany the disturbance of things long settled, and the stir of strong passions heated by fervent appeals to them, and by a consciousness of corporate sympathy. But the fire and fume of a healthy political life and growth are distinguishable at every point from the wanton abuse of the free mechanism of popular government for the sake of precipitating results, which either are achieved only in appearance, or, if achieved in reality, do, by enthroning the principle of premature, capricious, and needless revolution, bring with them infinitely more loss than gain.

If, as has been seen by the above brief illustrations, the conduct of the individual citizen is properly exposed to a moral criticism, on the ground of its conforming or not conforming to a purely moral standard, it is still more true that the state itself, in its relation towards its citizens and towards other states, is properly subjected to a like censure. The acts of the state are determined by its executive authority for the time being, by its legislature, and, in a popularly governed state, by the people. It is in the interaction of these three elements that the form and working of the constitution consist; and tho, for one purpose or another, one of these elements may have to take the initiative, the action of the constitution, whatever its form, must tend to bring them all into harmonious co-operation sooner or later, and so to make each department of the state, and the aggregate people above all, responsible for what is wrong and fairly to be accredited with what is right. It is in this way that when the conscience of the nation is spoken of, and the sins of a nation are denounced, this is by no merely loose analogy to the moral conformation of the individual human being. Man is gifted with such an inherently social constitution, that numbers of persons admit of being so organized as to take up into themselves, as it were, even the most spiritual elements which characterize each one of the component atoms. The perfection to which this sort of moral incarnation reaches will depend, in a state, on the constitution of that state, coupled with the facilities which exist for amending, controlling, or continuously inspiring that constitution. In whosesoever hands the supreme political

authority of the state at a given moment rests, that authority has cast upon it as its first duty the completion of the state itself by developing all the moral possibilities latent in the people, and to this end facilitating the acquisition of that organized force which enables the real proclivities and intuitions of the people most easily to express themselves, and most effectually to be converted into action. Certain practical corollaries follow from these positions.

In the first place, the existence of SLAVERY in a state is a certain sign either that the state has its conscience as yet only very imperfectly developed, or else that it acts habitually and persistently in defiance of the promptings of conscience. Wherever true slavery is found, there the cardinal political sin, as Coleridge pointedly described it, is committed of turning a *person* into a *thing*. The denial of human rights thereby implied, even if confined to ever so small a fraction of the community, and even if accidentally attended by every kind of modification and even humane compensation, is an outrage which can never be extenuated. The history, indeed, not only of the most enlightened Pagan nations, but of modern nations otherwise Christian, has shown the terrible inertness of the ruling portion of the community when brought face to face with classes of persons who either, by past conquests or long-inherited traditions, are found in a condition which is very favorable to the present well-being, or at least material enrichment, of all other persons but themselves. Experience has shown that the temptations to moral self-delusion, and even to religious casuistry, for the purpose of forging, pretexts for an institution incompatible with every idea of a true humanity, with all the free moral and spiritual elements comprised in the term, are facile and ever at hand to an extent which will probably dismay our posterity even to a greater extent than it does our more hardened selves.

What is true of slavery is true in only a less conspicuous degree of every denial of full political rights which is based on any other necessity than those contained in the disabling infirmities of age, mental infirmity, and penal disfranchisement. If the state has, in truth, all the essential elements of a moral and spiritual structure, this structure can only be composed out of the contributive humanity of every individual atom of the

population, and not of only a portion of those atoms, and still less of any capriciously or invidiously preferred portion of those atoms. Thus the course of historical development has been that of extending the suffrage downwards so as to embrace wider and wider classes, less obviously marked out at first as concerning themselves with political action, than with starting with the widest suffrage and limiting it afterwards. It is no exception to this, that the first English reform act of Henry VI.'s reign, by which the county suffrage was restricted to forty-shilling householders, was a disfranchising act. This was a special enactment for the purpose of procuring order in the county court at election time, and substituting a definite for an indefinite constituency. The notion of universal suffrage or of manhood suffrage never prevailed at any time in England, in which country, as in all other feudal states, the original basis of the suffrage was that of doing suit and service at the county court as a vassal of the king. The borough suffrage, again, had a distinct history of its own.

The modern extension of the suffrage is usually treated not as a moral requirement, but as a matter of mere political expediency, or, at the utmost, of compulsory necessity. When once, however, it is apprehended that for any classes in a community in full possession of political rights, and therefore theoretically, as well as to a great extent practically, in command of the state, to refuse a concession of like rights to any other classes of persons, not demonstrably incompetent, constitutes in the state an offence parallel to that of fraudulent misappropriation in the individual person, it is probable that political measures for a reconstruction of the franchise will be considered in a somewhat less exclusive and selfish spirit than is common. Corresponding to this duty on the part of the state is the duty of the citizen to exercise his right to vote, and to exercise it righteously.

Assuming that the state has reached a constitutional extension which affords a sufficient opening for the full exertion of the national voice, and for the effective manifestation of the national will, the first concern of those who are for the time the legislative and administrative organs of the state will be that of asserting at every point the truly moral constitution of the state itself as a supreme instrument for the evolution of all the fairest constitu-

ents of individual character and life. Among the institutions which even in pagan societies have been regarded, and are regarded, as of cardinal importance for the sustenance both of individual existence and of the state itself, is that of family life and of monogamic marriage, on the rigorous maintenance of which true family life can alone ultimately depend. In every wide national society very great latitude may properly be allowed for private associations of all kinds, whether for mere social purposes or for the higher ends of economic, industrial, scientific, religious, or political co-operation. But the issues concerned with the birth and early education of children, as well as with the character and circumstances of the initial groups on the vitality, strength, cohesiveness, and modes of reciprocal interaction, on which the healthiness of the whole body-politic turns, are of so momentous an importance that they cannot be left to individual choice or to the vagaries of scientific experiment, without the gravest dereliction of duty somewhere, and—if such a state of things is allowed to continue—everywhere. In the older feudal monarchies of Europe, penetrated as they are by the crystallized spirit and formal institutions of Christendom, monogamic marriage is so unassailably established, and contains so many conservative guarantees, that the main difficulty in some of these countries is to make just provision for unavoidable divorces, and to provide equitable arrangements for the unhampered marriage of persons belonging to different religious societies. The phenomenon in the United States of a large, well-populated, industrious, fertile, and otherwise highly organized district—always aspiring to be a State—being professedly built up on a foundation of polygamy, is a portent which can only fail to astonish and alarm the home as well as the foreign critic from that long familiarity with an evil which is at once its most dangerous consequence and its sorest punishment. Repeated indications in Presidents' Messages, desultory acts of Congress, and intermittent sallies of the central executive government, have at least had the effect of making an overt confession to the world that the wrong is one the flagrancy of which is nowhere denied, and to which the government is entitled and morally bound to apply a stringent and effective remedy. The federative system of government, the extreme distance

of the district implicated from the political centre of government, as well as—no doubt, to some extent—the torpidity of popular feeling in respect of an evil which has been long noiselessly growing and spreading, and up to 1864 divided the attention of moralists with another evil which could fitly be compared with it, and which had reached even still greater numerical and geographical dimensions, are among the reasons why the conscience of Americans is not roused to more immediate and decisive action. They have to remember, however, that every year's delay implies a fresh immolation of children under the wheels of the Juggernaut of the West, while the existence and presence which in fact constitute the public recognition of an evil so subtle and poisonous as this corrupts the whole public life at its very vitals, degrades the standard of private and public morality, and reduces to impotency the most heavily charged exhortations of the preacher directed against all other at present less favorably indulged atrocities of moral wrong.

A problem of a peculiarly modern kind has been presented by the practice, long habitual in European states, to avail themselves of the speculative tendencies of the mass of mankind, in order to enrich the state without apparent pressure in the way of taxation. This practice is now being abandoned in those states in which a liberal constitution has brought the conscience of the people adequately to bear upon it, and it will at no distant time probably go the way of all other desecrating stains on the ideal dignity of the state. It does not require any refined ethical analysis to demonstrate the viciousness of the practice alluded to. In the first place, not only are the vices of men rendered tributary to the state, and therefore matters inevitably regarded with political favor—an objection which so far equally applies to raising a large part of the revenue from the consumption of spirituous liquors; but over and above this operation which it has in common with excise duties on spirits fixed at a point which shall carefully fail of being prohibitory, state lotteries stimulate to the utmost the vices on which they repose, give the public guarantee of respectability to the indulgence in them, extend the temptations to them over vast classes of persons of all ages and positions to whom they would otherwise be strange, and by the mere force of associated interest and a sort of

riotous conspiracy in ill-doing, affect to build the stern fortunes of an immortal state on the most sandy of all foundations—public excitement for a flagitious cause. What is here said of state lotteries properly so called—that is, the practice of raising revenue directly by the institution of all the mechanism of general contribution, a few great prizes, a vast number of blanks, a widely extended system of advertisement, and all the glamour capable of being imparted to it by a superficial decorum in the elaboration of details, all under the direct executive administration of government, applies with little less force to all public patronage of gaming-tables, to fixed institutions for the direct encouragement of gambling, and the permission, whether legislative or executive, of even occasional lotteries which are on a scale extensive and pretentious enough to entrap and delude those innocent classes of society which, from their previous inexperience, are least likely to be able to save themselves from a wholly novel infection. Nothing, indeed, short of a determined recognition of the illegality of all public gaming-tables or institutions, permanent or temporary, which rest on a gambling basis can vindicate the honor of the state in this matter. And it will not be sufficient for the state to make laws, however severe, unless it practically secures that they are consistently and effectually enforced.

There are other modes of raising a revenue or of temporarily increasing the national resources, which, however supported at the moment by the popular voice, and however successfully they may evade the criticism of even the more sceptical members of society, are none the less tainted with immorality, and, to the extent that they prevail, are fraught with danger to the stability of the nation. To this class of expedients belong all remedies for current evils of the nature of confiscation of property, repudiation of debts, and what usually involves both the one and the other—depreciation of the coinage. This is by no means saying that revolutionary crises may not arise in which measures of these kinds, which usually must be characterized as suicidal, may not be morally justifiable as courses to be preferred to an instant plunge into anarchy. If these desperate adventures were only reserved for such epochs, they would scarcely come within the ken of the general moralist. It needs, however,

only to glance around at the actual practice of some states otherwise enjoying a reputation for justice and public honesty, and the language occasionally used in the legislative assemblies, and even the diplomatic correspondence with other states, to see that the current line drawn between justice and injustice, truth and falsehood, right and wrong, in the case of such financial topics as those adverted to, is far too often shamefully flickering and indistinct.

There is indeed one special abuse in this direction which is a peculiar growth of modern times, and is a product of the very increase of stability and of moral reputation to which, on the whole, modern states, as contrasted with ancient ones, have attained. This is the disposition to meet financial emergencies, deficits, or pressing and accidental claims by creating national debts, involving indefinite charges on the remotest posterity. The general principle is, indeed, publicly avowed, that a moral rule does apply to determine the cases in which it is, and in which it is not, legitimate to burden posterity. But the facility of obtaining money in this way often presents a seductive temptation to statesmen and political parties desirous of carrying out a policy of their own, and for a ready and persistent adherence to which they cannot steadily rely on the bulk of the population, nor expect to meet with all the sacrifices which the policy—if paid for at once, as is said "within the year," that is, by simple taxation—would involve. Yet not more in political circles than elsewhere is the facility for obtaining money always a moral justification of the means resorted to for obtaining it. That state is most truly a state which carries to the highest pitch the notions, so tardily and hardly acquired, of its own integrity, continuity, and immortality. Where the state shows itself reckless in regard to its future constituents, it not only demolishes its own public credit at home and abroad, sets a pernicious example of reckless prodigality in the sight of its own subjects, but to the extent that the financial operations go, impairs its own existence by a sort of constitutional suicide.

A more perplexed topic is presented by a very universal practice among modern Christian states, as well as among the states of antiquity, of organizing sexual vice by providing a special police machinery in the greater towns of a country, and

not merely for controlling the excesses or marking out the local boundaries of vicious indulgence, but for the purpose, or certainly with the obvious result, of encouraging and facilitating it, at all events, within those boundaries. The fact that the whole topic does, from its nature, escape the sifting discussion and public criticism to which every other class of questionable policy is in free states exposed, has had the effect of withdrawing it in a considerable degree from the unfettered and direct action of the public conscience. It is difficult to draw the line between the legitimate province of the state as occupied in curtailing the outward exhibition of vice, and even in restricting the far radiating physical inconveniences brought upon the innocent by the guilty, and the undoubted trespass outside the limits of that province committed in giving any, even the minutest, impetus to vice itself, in degrading one sex for the asserted gain of the other, and in lowering everywhere the standard of moral perfection which the laws of the state, tho incompetent directly to produce, must invariably confess and undeviatingly tend to bring about. When the history of these laws is thoroughly examined, it will be found that the defences of them are wholly *ex post facto*, that they rest on imagined benefits, which either do not follow at all, or are due to some casual operation of the police system which has nothing intrinsically to do with the licensing and medical inspection which is the essence of it; and that, lastly, the whole method owes its origin to countries and states of society so far already sunk in universal profligacy as to make for them the thought of even average purity and self-restraint seem a mere utopian vision. But it cannot be admitted that the morality of the future should be "cabined, cribbed, confined" by the dwarfing shrouds in which the dead past has buried its dead.

There is yet one topic which must be noticed as affecting the state's conscience of right and wrong—that is, the legitimacy of the use of certain punishments for crimes. It is now generally recognized that there are certain kinds of punishments, such, for example, as those which involve torture, mutilation, and certain forms of infamy, which no circumstances whatever can justify as available. There are others, such as capital punishment, on which opinion may be said to be sharply and deci-

sively divided. There are others, such as flogging, on which public opinion may be said to be wavering and unsettled. Two principles of moral criticism have, however, clearly emerged of late years. One is, that there are certain moral and personal attributes which constitute the humanity of every one, and that there are kinds of outrage on this humanity which no end whatever can justify the state in resorting to. Again, it is getting recognized that in all criminal punishments the moral improvement of the individual offender must be always maintained as one of the ends in view, so far as it is compatible with the protection of society. The application of these principles in detail is indeed not easy, and will long continue to promote debate among philanthropists and reformers. But it is no small gain to the cause of morality to have forever altered the aspect of criminal punishments from being violent, vengeful, and retaliatory conflicts with the defenceless wretch for whose crimes society is at least as much responsible as himself, to a deliberative and cautious essay as to how far the minimum of pain to one may be combined with the maximum of profit to all the parties involved. The majesty and authority of the state is far better manifested in using its giant strength with precision, with gentleness, and with caution, than (as was once supposed) in surrendering itself to the promptings of angry passion and a capricious vindictiveness better befitting children or madmen than rational human beings called to share in the divine task of government.

The aspects towards right and wrong of the individual citizen and of the state in its domestic relations have hitherto attracted less attention than the more obvious moral constitution and responsibilities of the state when brought into contact with other political or imperfectly civilized communities. In the last case the unity and integrity of the state are pre-eminently conspicuous, and the complexity of its action, as well as the counter-movements of opposed parties, from the ultimate reconciliation of which every determinate course of proceeding springs, is cloaked under the form of decisive administration and simple diplomatic utterances. Indeed, in very ancient times the good or bad faith of states towards each other in respect of the strict observance of treaties, of engagements towards commanders in

the field, promises to ambassadors, and capitulations of all sorts, were held to stamp the community with a permanent reputation of the highest or the lowest kind. It cannot be said that in modern times the stringent exactions of moralists in respect of ordinary good faith between state and state, as between other moral beings, is in any degree relaxed. A wholesome difference and improvement, however, is observable in the greater extension to which the moral scrutiny is carried out, and the more precise details to which it is held practically to apply. It is especially in the transactions of a stronger with a weaker state, or with a state which, through the momentary event of an unsuccessful war, finds itself in the condition of a weaker state, that the force of a purely ethical canon of action is most decisively put to the test. Not to dwell on the more perplexed and ambiguous history of British policy in the East Indies during the last century and a half, and the current treatment of hopeful aboriginal communities by British colonists, only too often aided by a mass of unscrupulous prejudice and guilty ignorance at home, the treatment of the great, tho unhappily, for too many purposes, impotent Chinese Empire, is a deplorable illustration of the quantity of iniquity which, even at the present day, one state may wreak on another without exciting animadversion or odium either at home or abroad. The facts are patent enough to the eyes of all men, that England first countenanced and patronized in every way it could the habitual evasion by its own subjects and by Chinese citizens of Chinese laws for the prevention of the importation of opium; that, because the Chinese Government determined, in the year 1839, to put into execution its own laws, and, after due notice given to British smugglers, confiscated smuggled opium which it destroyed without making the slightest profit from the enterprise, the British Government waged a desolating war with China, and extorted an enormous fine on which the merchant smugglers were held to have a claim by way of compensation for the losses incurred in conducting a confessedly illegal and contraband trade; that advantage was taken of the results of the war to wring from China a treaty by which the weaker state was compelled to open its ports for traffic with the stronger; that in 1859 fresh occasion was taken of what was allowed afterwards to have been a culpable mistake by

the British authorities as to the identity of a Chinese vessel, the Arrow, engaged in committing a breach of the Chinese revenue laws, to wage a fresh war with China, to carry into Chinese homes and remote and ancient cities calamity, anarchy, and moral chaos for the sake of exacting a fresh treaty, and thereby forcing the opening of a few more ports to British trade and securing a license to import opium into the country, in the face of the persistent policy of the Chinese Government, and the almost pathetic outcry of all the most provident and beneficent Chinese individual statesmen; that from that time to this, this iniquitous treaty of Tientsin has been jealously maintained, and an enormous trade in opium has been driven with China, the net value of the imported opium having gradually attained the amount of £7,000,000 sterling, while the political difficulty of retracing the steps taken is every year enhanced. The opium is furnished from the profits of the monopoly which the British Government has secured to itself of opium cultivation in British India; and therefore the issue so fatal to China seems almost inextricably bound up with the current financial system, not to say the solvency, of the British dominion in India.

It is impossible to recur ever so briefly to the several steps in the story of British relations with China without denouncing their flagrant defiance of even the least severe moral standard with an energy which no misnamed patriotism or indulgence to the sins of one's own race ought for a moment to weaken. Unfortunately the crimes are not only past, but are continuing, and indeed with every year are growing in atrocity. If the reviving strength of the Chinese Empire, or a more pronounced public opinion among the states of the world, can do anything to abate the wrong, before the moral sense of England is entirely ingulfed in it, and, by force even, can induce England at any cost to retrace her steps, to enter on a fresh course of policy directly opposed to the past, she will owe a debt of gratitude to the world for which her services in the world-wide lesson she has taught of constitutional government may be taken as a set-off.

From the numerous examples which have been above adduced of the application of a strictly moral standard to the

political acts of citizens, and to the executive, legislative, and international acts of states, it will have been sufficiently seen where the main difficulty lies in applying in detail the best acknowledged general principles. In all policy there must be a certain element of conjecture, of calculation, of comparison of ends, of the adjustment of means to ends, and, in a word, of quantitative measurement, which, in the more simple and spontaneous domain of individual life and action, would be irrelevant, and might seem even base. But at the best, and when the state is idealized to the utmost as an independent and responsible moral being, it still retains certain of the qualities and conditions of an artificially constructed machine. It can only be called into dynamical action by a concert of forces to be brought about by a more or less complex series of casually co-operating and frequently conflicting agencies. Much of the healthiest part of political life is concerned with bringing the latent opposition of persons and parties face to face, and with reducing the points of final divergence to such an extent that a clear line of common and united action may be discovered. But all this process implies delay, hesitation, uncertainty, and, even in some way, concessions and compromises. There are mental conditions which, on the face of them, are alien to the prompt and, as it were, intrusive as well as decisive suggestions, which, in the individual person of healthy moral organization are never lacking, and are deferred to with unquestioning obedience. But because prudence and calculation, as well as a peculiar complexity of action, distinguish the conduct of a state from that of any one of its citizens when dealing with his own private affairs, this is only an aggravation of the difficulty of the moral problem so soon as it is presented, and is no reason for ignoring its existence, and still less for a precipitate and nugatory attempt to solve it. The triumphs of Christian morality have, after centuries of ecclesiastical vagaries, been finally vindicated in the region of individual life and existence, for which it is now pretty universally confessed that no distinguishing line can be drawn between the consummated perfection of nature, for which the pagan moralist longed and longs, and the spotless holiness of the Christian who deems himself bound to be perfect as his Father in heaven is perfect. The last triumphs of the same morality

will manifest themselves in the building up for each state of a finely and exactly adjusted polity, or, in other words, of a city which "lieth four square," of which "the length is as large as the breadth," and the slow and struggling formation of which shall be then, and not till then, fully vindicated when the kingdoms of this world have become the kingdoms of our Lord and his Christ.

SHELDON AMOS.

ORTHODOX RATIONALISM.

AS the teacher of rhetoric told M. Jourdain in the play that he had been talking prose all his life without knowing it, so, were it not presumptuous, a philosophic critic might inform some of our most orthodox theologians that they have been speaking rationalism without being aware of it. Lessing's keen eye detected the similarity between his own sceptical methods and the arguments for Christianity in vogue among the theologians of his day. Of the Christian religion he wrote: "I believe it and hold it true so far and so strictly as one can believe and hold true anything whatever that is historical; for I can by no means gainsay it in its historical proofs. . . . With this explanation, I must think, might at least those theologians be satisfied who lower all Christian faith to human assent, and will know of no inward supernatural working of the Holy Ghost." Lessing seems to have caught a glimpse of some higher way to certainty in religion; had he left the lower levels upon which the controversialists of his day attacked and defended the received beliefs, and followed his own intimation of the better Christian way until, in a firm belief in the immediate influence of the Holy Spirit, he reached that ground of Christian confidence which Schleiermacher afterwards gained above historical doubts, Lessing, the father of modern rationalism, might have become the first of modern defenders of faith. But in the providential ordering of history Lessing's work—the work of the keen, clear-sighted, earnest doubter—was needed before theology itself could be prepared for Schleiermacher's loftier and larger vision; and rationalism both in unbelief and in orthodoxy must be thoroughly wrought out before the preparation can be completed for another and better age of faith.

Sceptical rationalism and orthodox rationalism are similar in their partial methods and essential narrowness of conception, and both should be set aside in the interest alike of philosophy and of faith. I shall endeavor, therefore, to trace the error of an inadequate rationalistic method through current orthodox modes of reasoning, and to indicate the broader and more spiritual method of thinking which in many minds is now happily taking the place of orthodox rationalism.

It is often difficult to express in definite forms differences of tendency and of spirit which we may recognize under identical confessions of faith. The same creeds often cover divergent tempers of mind. The differences which I would bring to light are to be found among those who hold the same general beliefs; but they are radical differences, not of faith, but of method in theology, and of a nature so wide-reaching, and in some respects even revolutionary, that they need to be recognized and better understood by those who would work at least for the future of Christian theology.

To fix, then, more definitely the idea intended to be conveyed by the phrase "orthodox rationalism," a general definition of rationalism may first be necessary. As a disposition of mind, or method of belief, rationalism is simply the habit of referring to the reason as the sufficient and final authority of truth. That is true which can be made evident to the understanding, or proved to be in accordance with the principles of reason. In the intellect is the light of all our seeing. The constitution of the mind, the laws of cognition, the first truths of reason, afford the means and tests of all valid knowledge. To seek to look beyond these is mysticism or transcendentalism in philosophy; to believe when these are silent may be pietism, but it is not reason in theology. How far, then, I ask, may orthodoxy itself be bound under rationalistic limitations, and, unconsciously perhaps, proceed in a rationalistic spirit, in its conduct of the argument for Christianity?

I. Orthodoxy has not entirely escaped an unworthy rationalistic conception of human nature. The psychology underlying and coloring the so-called New England theology has been more rationalistic than its advocates have been aware. A reformed psychology would seem to be still one of the first needs of our

New England schools of philosophy and theology. The current method is, or perhaps we should say has been, too analytic and individualistic—an atomistic rather than an organic science of mind. The revolution which has taken place during this century in the science of chemistry affords some profitable suggestions for the work needing to be done in the science of man. The older methods of chemical analysis gave us a knowledge of the elements and atomic weights; but the present science of chemistry is largely synthetic, and is increasing our knowledge of the unities of force and life. Nothing is studied and weighed as an isolated phenomenon, as an individual thing; but everything is viewed in its relations and co-ordination—the world to present science is a unity of forces. But the psychology which our theology seems most inclined to employ is too largely analytic and atomistic. Man is divided into three grand departments—intellect, sensibilities, and will—each one of which can be shut off from and considered apart from the others: one compartment may be damaged while the others are left intact, as some theologians judge that sin is only a corruption of the sensibilities, while others insist that the will also is ruined. So far as such analysis may serve clearness of thought and be used as one means of investigating mental phenomena, no objection need be made to it; but the danger lies in losing sight of the fact that man is a spiritual unity, one living whole, to be known and understood in relation to the totality of his environment. If we put asunder in thought what God has joined together in the living reality of consciousness, we may endanger the very integrity and soundness of all our natural faiths. It will hardly be safe to require some single faculty, some isolated activity of man, as his understanding or reason, to bear the whole weight of those great faiths which come to us through the harmonious exercise of all our powers; which rest broadly and securely upon the whole experience of life. This analytic psychology, however correct it may be as an anatomy of mind, is not true to the life; for we are ourselves in every faculty and function: in reasoning we do not use the understanding merely; in willing we are also thinking; and in feeling we begin also both to think and to will—our self-conscious life is one continuous living synthesis, and as such it should be studied and understood in any philoso-

phy equal to the methods of true scientific knowledge. It is rationalistic, and not scientific, psychology to set up a part or function of self-conscious life as the master-power and judge of the whole; to substitute the faculty of reason for man learning by all his experience what he should do and believe. Truth must be something more than the mere relation of ideas to our powers of cognition; truth can be known best and most fully through a perfect life.

On account of a too exclusive analytic method our current mental science fails to render any satisfactory explanation of the origin and vital necessity of the first truths of the reason, or the real development of man's great spiritual faiths. The usual intuitional philosophy begins rather with the mind as a ready-made construction. The starting-point of its inquiries is the natural constitution of the mind. The native elements of consciousness analysis cannot break up into simpler ideas. These are the elements of mental chemistry which we should accept as we find them, and use with logical consistency in constructing our systems of thought. This philosophy is certainly clear and satisfactory so far as it goes, and upon its foundations theology has usually been satisfied to build. But now the very foundations are questioned. When theology entrusts man's spiritual faiths to this constitutional philosophy of human nature, it fails to protect them from the approaches of a science to which no constitutions are sacred, no existing products elementary, and which is determined to follow every idea and belief as well as every present form or species in nature back as far as it possibly can down the age-long course of development towards the unknown Power from which all things have proceeded. Herbert Spencer can be fairly and fully met only by a spiritual philosophy which shall be able to follow him step by step along the processes through which man has at last come to himself as a moral and rational being, and to show at every stage of this evolution of the creation the presence and power of something which is more than the natural—of something spiritual and divine in human nature. We may not, it is true, carry the analysis of moral ideas and intuitions any farther than the intuitional philosophy usually does; but we cannot stop content with mere mental or logical "criteria of truth;" we must justify the

right of theology to exist in the spiritual life of man, and discover the reality of things unseen and spiritual—the reality of God—not merely in the ideas which we possess of them, but in the very origin of those ideas; in the manner in which they are born in human consciousness, and grow with our growth, and become life of our life. In one word, theology is at a disadvantage before agnostic science so long as it is willing to defend itself with an analytic and rationalistic mental science; it needs to work out in the interest of faith an organic and dynamic mental philosophy—a science of the spiritual growth of mind. The need of a revision of the inherited psychology, as well as the singular deficiency of the traditional mental science, is apparent when we consider the place and significance usually given in our text-books of mental philosophy to the feelings. So helplessly has our psychology fallen into the traditional treatment of that most interesting and divine side of human consciousness that the very activities and receptivities through which, if at all, we are brought into contact with, and under the power of, outward and divine realities, have come to signify in common philosophical language only subjective states, emotions, or appetencies, of the soul. They are said to be called forth by ideas. An idea must first strike the mind before it can glow with emotion. Consequently the feelings, in this rationalistic philosophy of them, can have no objective or real significance. They are simply states of mental temperature—exponents of the mind's own activity, not indications of any pressure from without of reality upon the mind.

But what warrant is there in the living processes of consciousness for this summary treatment of the feelings? Is all feeling emotive? What warrant is there for the assumption that all mental and moral sensibility is subjectively excited, is a play of feeling called forth merely by ideas? Is it consistent for a philosopher to be a realist in his theory of sensation and perception, and then to be an idealist in his theory of mental and moral feeling? If the mind is affected from without in sensation, we cannot tacitly assume that it is affected only from within in its higher feeling of dependent existence and moral obligation. If, on the contrary, we may suppose that man is a living unity, born into a universe of powers and realities which are partly sensible and

partly supersensible; then how else than through sensation and through feeling, at first vague and indeterminate, and then becoming fixed and formed in necessary ideas, could man become conscious of himself in his environment, material, spiritual, divine? We need for Christian theology a psychology which shall be true to the actual processes of man's life; which shall seek to understand consciousness, not by verbal dissection of it, but by following its living development; which shall have some account to give of the rise of ideas out of impressions; of the crystallization of undefined and general elements of consciousness into conceptions; of the formation of intellectual feelings into rational beliefs. But the habit of regarding reason as the beginning and the end of mind, of reducing the rich manifold development of self-conscious personality to a bare process of thought, and substituting the logic of ideas for the logic of life,—in one word, rationalistic narrowness and onesidedness in mental philosophy,—has hampered theology, and prevented even the intuitionalists from following up their own advantage, and gaining through a better apprehension of the objective and divine significance of mental and moral feeling a complete victory over the scepticism of Kant.

Orthodoxy is too hampered by rationalistic limitations in its conceptions of God. It needs to escape from the deficiencies of the rationalizing intellect both in its method of belief in the existence of God and in its mode of viewing the perfections of the divine nature. If there really is a God, he will prove himself to us; we shall not first cause him to exist to our own thought. Our so-called proofs of God will only be the representation in thought of the Reality which has already been presented to our consciousness. A God needing to be proved to the understanding would be no God, but at best only an idea of God to which we might give rational assent. A God proved by us would be a God made by us. A real God is a being revealing himself to our consciousness, impressing himself upon us, in manifold ways making himself felt in our life. Only as he is before us in our thought of him can we cherish a real belief in him; he must first lay hold of us before we can lay hold of him; we are to apprehend that for which also we are apprehended; we love him because he first loved us. So the Scriptures.

rising above the limits of the proud rationalizing intellect, place God first, and the divine activity before ours, in the origin of real faith. There may lurk, then, a rationalistic denial of God in the very attempt to make God exist as a reasonable conclusion of our logic, to prove by our own mental efforts the God who is already in the very life and motion of all our thoughts. Not only do all arguments in proof of the existence of God presuppose the idea of God, but also all reasoning from our finite experience up to the Supreme Cause and Ultimate Reason in all things implies the activity of the divine Intelligence in the processes of our mental life. "We think God through God." Not only is thought itself a spiritual process without any analogy in material growths and implying a higher Power, but also the process of thinking God can take place only through God. The object thought—God—is present and potential in the act or process of thinking God. Prof. Dorner penetrates beneath the superficial rationalism of the proofs of God ordinarily to be found in text-books of divinity, and expresses in a pregnant phrase his profounder apprehension of man's spiritual consciousness when he says, "We think God through God." Our belief in God, then, is not merely the end of a series of logical probabilities; it is not a startled leap of faith from the world as a finite premise to God as an infinite conclusion—all reasoning from nature up to God, if God is not first in our thoughts, involves either false logic or a pseudo-Infinite. Belief is not merely the reading off from the constitution of the mind certain signs which warrant us in the inference that once, at least, a God existed who made these marks of his handiwork upon the mental instrument. Neither is our belief only the acceptance and understanding of the necessary forms or laws of thinking. Rather, belief is the realization in thought of what is given, and ever repeated, in the spiritual life. It is the coming out in ideas of the reason of the Presence and Power at the source of self-consciousness, which is active and potential in all the activities and processes of rational life and thought. It is the recognition, more or less clear, more or less inadequate, of a Divine working in mind and nature. This recognition of the Divine is seen to be the true interpretation of my own self-consciousness, and by means of it I find then, what otherwise fails me, a consistent

interpretation of nature. First thinking myself through God, I am able also to think nature through God; I begin to understand its development and order, to discern a sufficient reason for its existence, and to feel the pulse of a unifying principle of life in its ever-changing activities, as I think nature through God whom I have recognized as the Being in whom I live and move and have my being.

Whenever we would justify to the reason our real faith in the existence of God we are driven back to some form of the ontological argument. But that argument is of no more avail than any other, and fails to produce anything but notional assent to a necessary idea of God, if we are content to regard it as a logical process, and do not go farther and deeper, and follow it as it is actually conducted in the growth of our belief in God, and in the real religious history of the world. The mere statement, in other words, of the ontological argument does not take us beyond subjective ideas. But the actual operation of reason, the living spiritual consciousness, of which the argument is a mental representation, does bring us under the impression of Reality, and we cannot in thought escape from our sense of the Infinite Presence. The ontological argument may not be sufficient as mere logic—the finite cannot prove the infinite—but it is sufficient as a transcript of real life. The necessary idea of God is the compulsion in our thought of the perfect Being. The necessity is not merely mental or constitutional; it is an organic necessity, the result and exponent of the whole relation of a living soul to the living God. In short, the ontological argument, like all other so-called proofs of God's existence, brings us ultimately to the self-revelation of God in the activities, processes, and necessities, of self-conscious life and thought. God is thus not only the ground of his own existence in eternity, but the ground also of the idea of himself in the history of man. Were there no God active and potential in the human mind, no man ever would have thought of him. Unless we are prepared to recognize this profoundest of all facts, the fact of the outgrowth of our ideas of moral and spiritual Reality from something at work beneath consciousness, at the root of all our thinking, we have no escape from the alternative of a theology of notional probabilities on the one hand, or the formal scepticism of Kant on the other

hand. But if we shall succeed in ridding our psychology of rationalistic assumptions, we shall have gained a foundation for real faith in our theology. When we shall give up the attempt to understand the mind as a mechanical construction; when we shall look upon man as an organic growth and unity, taking up into his life, and realizing in his consciousness, the manifold influences of his environment—then it may be no more difficult for us to recognize the reality of the spiritual and divine powers which he feels, with which his thought is tremulous, and by which his very being is shaped and swayed, than it is for us to admit the forces exerted upon him of outward and physical causation. The former are among the permanent and persistent powers which make man what he is; no child grows up without in some manner coming under their sway; and when a soul yields to their influence, no magnetism is so great or so beneficent. Let our Christian philosophy become as boldly dynamical as our physical science is; let it take account of the forces concerned in the formation and fruits of man's consciousness,—and then our theology may find in man's living, working, undying, spiritual faiths the intimations and exponents, if not the adequate revelation, of that supreme Power—not unknown, for it is in us, yet incomprehensible, for it is above us—which is the sufficient explanation of the universe.

We find traces and vestiges of rationalism, also, in orthodox conceptions of the nature and attributes of the Deity. An artificial analysis of human nature magnified to infinity has become the theological conception of Deity. Each one of the supposed faculties and powers of man's nature being indefinitely enlarged, and regarded as existing in absolute perfection in the nature of God, the problem of theology has then been to conceive of these attributes of Deity in some intelligible unity and co-ordination, and to determine their relation to the creation and the course of human history. These predicates and attributes have been treated almost as tho they were distinct entities, and each of them must be individually satisfied in the relations of God to his creatures. Hence theology by its too analytical and unethical conception of God has involved itself in many difficulties in its discussion of God's ways towards men, which do not seem to have troubled the apostles who had been trained

under the vivifying influence of Jesus' simpler and more spiritual sense of the heavenly Father. For example, the idea of power torn asunder from its dependence upon the whole moral nature of God, and magnified into the idea of isolated Omnipotence, has lent additional perplexity to the old problems concerning the origin of evil and the prevention of sin. Could not Omnipotence prevent sin? But God's power is not God, and his relation to his creation is at all times a relation of the whole Godhead, and not of any single attribute. What Omnipotence might do is one question—a question of an abstract theology; what God can do is another question—a question of real history to be determined, so far as we may hope to answer it, in the light of what God has done. So also the idea of knowledge expanded into Omniscience, and the idea of will increased to an all-efficient causation, and treated in an abstract isolation, almost as tho these attributes were God, have led theologians to plunge into extreme theories of foreordination and decrees, and involved evangelical faith in metaphysical difficulties which the Scriptures in their simple, real sense of the living God neither raise nor solve. Even worse confusion and disaster to faith has resulted from the separation of the moral aspects of the divine nature into distinct and even opposing attributes, into which the prevalence of rationalistic modes of thinking, lacking in ethical and spiritual discernment, has too often betrayed even evangelical theology. Righteousness and mercy have been set over against each other; justice has been divided, in theological lectures, into several different kinds and species; and then the doctrine of the atonement has required labored ingenuity on the part of theologians to show how attributes of God so opposing were reconciled in Christ; and some of the moral elements of the divine nature are sometimes represented as demanding still the punishment of sin. So does unconscious rationalism in theology corrupt the simplicity of the Gospel! A father, a mother, suffering the shame of a son's sin, and forgiving it, knows, with a deeper insight than any theology of the mere intellect can gain, the divine necessity of forgiveness through the Cross!

It has been questioned by a profound critic whether Calvinism does not introduce dualism into the very nature of God (Dorner, "Geschichte der prot. Theologie," s. 392). An all-wise

Will has been made in Calvinism, to an unfortunate extent, a theological substitute for the God of the Bible. Calvinism has thus suffered from a conception of God more rationalistic than ethical and spiritual. Jesus came preaching not the kingdom of Will, or Wisdom, or Foreordination, but the kingdom of God. The whole Godhead is in every attribute and every act of Deity, and God is himself personally concerned in the administration of his kingdom. We cannot, then, conceive of God as willing, or as knowing, taking precedence of God as loving; the relation of God to history is a relation of the living God to man—a personal relation. God is love. Calvinism has been in danger of losing the full biblical revelation of God in a one-sided intellectual apprehension of God as omnipotent Will or as inscrutable Wisdom. So far as it has been betrayed into this mode of apprehending God, its conception has been but rationalism in disguise; for it is an idea of the intellect substituted for a reality of the Spirit. The love of clear thinking and of following thought to its last logical conclusion has been the temptation to this worship of a mental image of God. Mysticism has been the protest of the spirit against the common fault of both Calvinistic theology and modern rationalism, the undue exaltation of the understanding and the want of the heart in the intellect. Above all rationalism, whether of belief or unbelief, is the theology of the Bible, "Every one that loveth is born of God and knoweth God. He that loveth not, knoweth not God: for God is love."

The same error of unconscious rationalism impairs not infrequently orthodox teachings concerning the nature of religion. Popular scepticism is constantly confounding the mental acceptance of Christian dogmas with the life of faith. Unbelief is inclined to regard faith as a certain relation of mind to Christian ideas rather than as a relation of the whole man through the person of Christ to the whole God. But evangelical impatience at this superficial conception of belief should be checked and sobered by the recollection that it has been encouraged and spread among the people by the proneness of theologians to treat the good news of God in Christ as a "scheme" of salvation, to insist upon the system of revealed truth, and often practically, tho not intentionally, to make Christian ideas take

the place in preaching of the Christian religion. Not long since, for instance, in an ecclesiastical assembly, I heard religion defined and commended as belief in revealed truth! And not one word of dissent was uttered at this thoroughly rationalistic definition of religion. The speaker immediately afterwards escaped from the shallowness of his own definition, as he proceeded to speak, evidently out of his own deeper experience, of the power of the Holy Ghost. But one of the causes of scepticism among religiously trained men at the present day has been the unfortunate habit, not sufficiently guarded against in the controversial divinity of the last generation, of putting systems of truth before the soul in the place of God—the light in which God is revealed for the revealed God. Christ was a divine fact before ever he was a doctrine of the church—a fact of divine power among men, a Person full of the Spirit of God; and Christianity, intellectually complete as we find it to be, and transcendently glorious to the reason, is first of all and above all a revelation, a message of personal friendship, a word of welcome and restored communion between God and man.

A similar rationalistic imperfection hampers often our theology in its discussion of what are called the doctrines of grace. God and the human soul seem to be conceived of as two distinct spheres, each complete in itself, the one finite, the other infinite—the soul a world having its life in itself; and then the problem of theology is, how can these separate existences be conceived of as co-working in the new life of the Spirit? how can the human will and divine grace be reconciled? The initial conception is mechanical and unworthy, and the chief difficulty in many and many a theological discussion of the new birth and higher life of man is occasioned by the false rationalistic assumption, quietly suffered to slip into the premises, that a created soul is in itself and by virtue of its own rational powers a complete and independent individuality, as tho there could be a living, growing human personality without God. It is a poor escape from pantheism to fall into spiritual independency in religion. But our theology, in its anxiety to avoid all appearance of pantheism, has often rushed into an untenable individualism, and imperilled Jesus' teaching of the new birth and the apostolic doctrine of the Holy Ghost by its neglect of the truth of

the immanence of God, and by mechanical, atomistic conceptions of the human soul and the relation of free will to grace. It is in orthodoxy a survival of a partial and defective rationalistic habit of thought to assume that God projected the soul out of himself as a perfect world having everything necessary to its being and life in its own little circle of existence; and that, having once created it in this its complete individuality, henceforth God can only touch it and move it *ab extra*, or sway and govern it as a sun might throw the lines of its attraction over an outlying world. Even the influences of human friendship might suggest the possibilities of a more intimate relationship than this between the spirit of man and the Father of spirits. We never learned this unnatural independency of man, and separation of the soul from Him who is all in all, from the Bible or from Jesus Christ. All his words and thoughts imply the manifestation of God in the life of man, and his own oneness with the Father—the consummation and perfection of human nature in union with the divine. There is a mystery of the divine power at the root of every springing blade of grass; and there is a mystery of the divine presence in the germination of every soul-life and its growth and unfolding. Man never rises entirely out of nature, never becomes a complete moral personality, except as God is with him. "Except ye abide in me," ye cannot bear fruit; such is the last and largest law of soul-formation and growth to perfection. Take from us the Spirit of God, and we should fall, if not into annihilation, at least out of moral personality down to the level of mere things.

As might be supposed, this initial vice of unnatural separation between the soul and God—as tho they were from the moment of man's creation distinct worlds, capable only of outward action and reaction the one upon the other—affects with incurable scepticism the whole rationalistic view of revelation, or the history of God's activity in the life of man. The supernatural is at the outset rendered impossible, not by an induction of facts, but by an unnatural theory of man and an unworthy idea of God. As the individual mind is regarded as a complete autocracy, so the race is treated as an integer, having the powers of development in its own inherent forces, and consequently its history is and must be looked upon solely as man's record of

himself. The idea of revelation would involve, accordingly, the supposition of an enforcement of truth upon the human reason from without, and by the suspension of its ordinary activities; and such interference could be authenticated only by miracles, which in turn would be conceived of as blows struck by the hand of the Almighty in the face of nature. But even tho such interference with the established course of nature be admitted as conceivable, it is held to be so contrary to experience as to be incapable of historical demonstration. The laws of reason are necessary, but historical events are accidental; historical knowledge is dependent upon testimony which may be untrustworthy, while rational knowledge is necessary and not to be set aside by accidental beliefs. Such is the force of Lessing's famous objection to historical Christianity, and it is the best thing rationalism has ever said. But the orthodoxism of his day could not meet his doubt of historical faith because it shared in the moral fallacy of his rationalism, and our theology is still at a disadvantage when it seeks to uphold similar unspiritual views of revelation. If the evidences of Christianity are only of an external kind; if our belief in revelation depends upon our theory of inspiration; if our faith in Christ rests ultimately upon the records of his miracles—then Christianity does fall into Lessing's category of the accidental truths of history, and our faith in it cannot rise higher than its source and be more than a greater or less historical probability. But there is a deeper philosophy of man and his history. There is a view to be gained of the supernatural which makes it the most natural of all facts. A better theology than the orthodox rationalism of Lessing's day, than its methods still lingering in our day, regards God as the necessary inspiration of man's whole rational life; and there is a necessary revelation of God likewise in and through human history. From the very nature of God as creative and self-imparting love, from the primal and essential nature of man as made for God, history is and must be not only man's realization of his own freedom and working out of his own destiny, but also the record which God has given of himself in his Son. Revelation has not been something accidental and adventitious, but a necessary and, in the largest sense, natural element and factor of man's progress and history. Christianity did not fall from above

upon the world accidentally, as a comet might strike the earth, disturbing its regular orbit, and leaving the evidences of its shock in the signs and wonders which its concussion might have produced in the heavens and upon earth. Christianity came from above; but it came without observation, and as the power of God for whose advent the world had been prepared from eternity. Supernatural forces have been naturalized on earth in the course of revelation, and in the final dispensation of the Spirit. The facts of Christianity are not "accidental facts" of history, but necessary facts, prepared from before the foundation of the world—God-facts underlying the whole creation—Love entering into the life of the world and redeeming it from its own undoing. The coming of the Messiah is, in this comprehensive, cosmical conception of it, the fulfilment of the first, last, and highest law of the creation; the Incarnation is the final and perfect relation of the whole God to the whole universe.

Can our theology make thorough work with the evidences of Christianity upon any lower range of conceptions than the one just indicated, or by the use merely of the traditional method of philosophy? The question leads to the second part of the present essay for an improved method in theology.

We need in Christian apologetics, and no less also in the reworking of Christian dogmatics, a philosophic method thoroughly purged of the leaven of rationalism. Of all improvements in theology, the most needed and hopeful pertains to its method. There has been already more change in this respect than might appear upon the surface. The younger divines are almost compelled by their contact with the thinking of the times to form for themselves a new "Grammar of Assent." Evangelical scholars who are training themselves for their coming life-work by wrestling with the angel of the Lord who, in the form of scientific scepticism, strives all this night long with faith for the sake of blessing it, are conscious that they differ from older and honored divines who dwell contented in their age under their own vine and fig-tree, in nothing so much as in respect to the method in which the times call them to pursue their inquiries and to contend for their faiths. The deepest and most significant theological change in our day is not a change of creed, not a revolution of beliefs. They greatly mistake, as

it seems to me, the signs of the times who look for another Christ or a new Gospel. But a great change is taking place in methods of theological inquiry and modes of religious expression. We feel this new, fresh breeze as the coming of a reviving Spirit over the old and parched fields of theological study. The movement has already rejuvenated our biblical literature, and it rustles through the sermons of many who know not whence it cometh nor whither it goeth. But it is a better method, born of the Spirit, for the renewal of theology and the revival of faith.

A few words of more specific characterization of this better method in theology may serve to bring out more clearly the distinctions already generally described in the endeavor to show the rationalistic vices latent in much orthodox theology.

The better method is dynamical rather than statical. It deals, that is to say, with forces and formations rather than with constitutions and constructions. It seeks to interpret results in mind and history by following with patient investigation the processes of life through which they have come to be what they are. It seeks to understand the living, growing synthesis of the unities of nature, not content with the mere analysis of formed products, or the philosophic dissection of dead thoughts. This more scientific method may be illustrated by reference to certain characteristic differences between the Scotch philosophy, which has largely dominated New England theology, and the best German metaphysics since Kant. The Scotch method is statical and constitutional; the German method of faith is dynamical and genetic. The former, that is to say, takes up the mind as one might a music-box, and notes the tunes which it has been made to play; or as one might examine a mathematical instrument, and read off its signs. These, it holds, are our first faiths, the native music of the soul; these are the tests or "criteria" of truth, and all rational belief must begin by accepting them in good faith. If we will not use these, we have no means of making any scientific survey of the universe. This constitutional philosophy has the merit of definiteness, clearness, and logical cogency, but it is out of relation to modern evolutionary thought, and fails to meet fully the demands of a scientific method in theology.

The other and more satisfactory method, in contrast with the prevalent Scotch philosophy, I have called dynamic and genetic. It seeks, that is, to apprehend nature and mind in their forces and growth. Its first terms, its last words, are not of ideas and forms of thought, but of powers and processes of life. Mind is to its view not an instrument, but an organism; thought is not in its origin an exercise of reason, but a manifestation of a life. As a plant is not to be conceived of simply as a collection of cells bound together into a system according to some specific type, but as an organism growing from a hidden root, shaped by various forces, and pulsating with the sunbeams; so, and much more significantly, mind is an organic unity, having its hidden root beneath consciousness in the deep things of God, vibrating with manifold influences, and tremulous with the Light in which its life blossoms forth. This philosophy accepts loyally the first truths, the primitive cognitions, in which the Scotch metaphysics rests; but it regards them as the exponents of the powers which make man what he is; and beneath the first-fruits of rational consciousness it seeks to apprehend the spiritual and divine chemistry of their growth. Certainly, if we have once gained this conception, however vaguely, that man comes to himself in the midst of the powers of the universe, and is in all his manifold, conscious life himself a pulsating centre of forces, a being of wonderful receptivities and activities, himself the most living being in the whole world except God, we shall hardly remain satisfied with the inventory of man's faculties and primitive beliefs so confidently repeated to us by the Scotch intuitional philosophy as the sum of our knowledge and the final account of our consciousness. The endeavor to understand mind as a spiritual unity in relation to the forces, physical, moral, spiritual, with which it is alive, may often lead us into vague and unsatisfactory thinking, may leave us in mysticism, or betray us into pantheistic modes of expression; but with all its dangers and vagaries, with all its imperfections and confusions, this method is a philosophy of the Spirit which makes alive, and not a philosophy of the letter which killeth—a philosophy of the life of the soul, and not of the mere written constitution of the mind: and it is the only method by means of which we may hope to overleap

the scepticism of Kant, and to gain high ground above the materialism which is "the slough of despond" to modern thought.

This better method may be described again as a thoroughly ethical method. Rationalism has always lacked ethical insight and moral thoroughness. It does not have what Wordsworth learned to know as "the feeling intellect." Moral reason is reason in the highest. The coming method in philosophy we may be assured will be through and through ethical. It will seek to understand the laws of nature, and to interpret the mysteries of the creation, in the light of the best and purest moral life. Being thus dynamical and ethical, it must also be in the truest sense spiritual. It deals with living unities; it recognizes moral reason manifesting everywhere its touch in the direction and co-ordination of forces; and it cannot give, accordingly, a merely physical explanation of the least existing thing. The whole universe grows from a spiritual source, and quivers in all its forces with God.

It would be beyond my present purpose to defend the validity of this method against a materialistic denial of it. It has been my object, rather, to point out the fact that rationalistic modes of thinking may still survive in the favorite ideas and reasonings of those very theologians who would be most horrified should they be suspected of entertaining rationalism in their creeds; and also to show that newer methods in theology, of which they are timid, and which they sometimes even make haste to condemn, are really, on the part of those who are guided in their theology by them, a sincere endeavor to escape from the onesidedness and superficiality of sceptical naturalism, and to find a thoroughly scientific and truly spiritual basis and method of faith. This endeavor is certainly revolutionizing the whole department of apologetics. In the field of revelation it gives free play to legitimate biblical criticism, while it asserts the capacity of human nature for inspiration from the Most High, and finds in the development of the religion of the Bible up to its fulfilment in Christ unmistakable evidence of the presence and working of God. In philosophy it meets materialism by accepting with quiet confidence all its proved facts, and showing, as Lotze has so often done, the greater need of a spiritual explanation of the commonest relations of things. It meets scepticism

by its belief in the operation of the Spirit of God in the first motions and activities of mind and conscience. It transcends rationalism and rises above the many contradictions and perplexities of the understanding by its discovery, in the actual experience of life and the history of man, of the truth that reason does not make faith, and that it is not, consequently, in the power of reason to unmake it. Faith is the true Life manifesting itself, and bearing witness that it is true, in the life of man. We believe not in conclusions about God; we believe—in the very process of living and loving we believe—in the Holy Ghost.

While thus Christian evidences are being rewritten and revivified in the light of a spiritual method, our dogmatics are showing also, tho more slowly, the stirrings of the coming day. The signs of reconstruction are not far to seek. Every doctrine is to be thought out afresh and taught in methods better suited to the temper of the times. Theology cannot remain content with repeating the old phrases for faith when science offers a richer natural language for the expression of spiritual truth. Rationalism has had its hour. Naturalism is having its day. Faith can never be long absent from human hearts. Upon the horizon of our times are many signs that doubt is clearing off, and the promise of a fairer, brighter day to-morrow. Theology has a sacred past, and it has a still diviner future. We may not yet know the fulness of the dispensation of the Spirit.

NEWMAN SMYTH.

THE PAINTER'S ART.

PAINTING may be defined as the art of expressing emotional ideas and sensible images by means of color and form. There is no better definition than that of M. Charles Blanc, who defines it as "the art of expressing the conceptions of the soul by means of the realities of nature, represented on a smooth surface by their forms and colors."

In tracing the technical development of painting as a fine art, we must go back to the thirteenth century, in Italy, to the dawn of the Renaissance. Previous to the thirteenth century painting was a neglected art. Sculpture had preceded painting in its development, having previously received a quickening impulse. Previous to the thirteenth century the catacombs afford some light by which to study the earlier glimmerings of this art. Their subterranean frescos and mosaics, tho of the crudest description, and of a very formal type, nevertheless show some effort to express the forms, the symbols, and even the aspirations of early Christian worship. But previous to the thirteenth century the arts were all subject to the teachings of the modern Greeks, or Byzantines, a race we are never to confound with their ancestors. For the most part they were workers in mosaic, with a formal, conventional manner, void of nature, and entirely inspired by mere tradition. About the middle of the thirteenth century schools of art were formed at Sienna and at Pisa, designed principally to educate the sculptors engaged upon the cathedrals and other public works then in process of erection. It is due to the establishment of these schools of sculpture that a luxurious development followed which continued in regular and progressive sequence down to the seventeenth century. Thus as in ancient Greece, so in modern Tuscany, sculpture

preceded painting in its development; and this is a very natural following, since all that is meritorious in painting must ever rest upon a firm foundation of form. The sculptor Nicola Pisano, born about the middle of the thirteenth century, was the first who gave expression to the forward movement of his age; and he did this by applying himself to the study of ancient Greek marbles at Pisa, particularly a certain sarcophagus, the sides of which were ornamented with reliefs. This may still be seen in the Campo Santo, adjoining the cathedral at Pisa. This turning aside from the conventional practice of the time to the study of the ancients marked the dawn of that great revival which followed. The modern Greeks, or Byzantines, had rendered art immobile, rigid, formal. Nicola Pisano gave it that first impulse which liberated it from these conventionalities, and he did this by applying himself to the study of the few ancient Greek sculptures then discovered. The Byzantines had rendered all progress impossible in art, so that it had become as stationary in its character as the Egyptian. It was Nicola Pisano who first taught the artists of his time to shake off the trammels of the modern Greeks and adopt the ancients for their models; and this was the germ of that new-birth in art and letters termed the Renaissance. For in literature we find the same cause operating with like results. The study of the classics tended rapidly to unfold a new and grander impulse. Dante directly attributes the elegance of his style to the study of Virgil:

> "Thou art my master, and my author thou,
> Thou alone the one from whom I took
> The beautiful style that has done honor to me."

Through this return to the study of the ancients, the true path, leading directly to nature under the best guidance, was again discovered and followed with the grandest results.

Pisano did not, it is true, as did his followers, go straight to nature for instruction under that system, but he did the next best thing, he endeavored to imitate the ancient Greek spirit and forms, and by this means he gave, says Taine, the first shake to the hitherto immobile Byzantine type. He supplanted, in his works, the meagre, ascetic saints, and designed figures con-

ceived with well-proportioned forms built upon a substantial framework of anatomical truth.

To Nicola Pisano succeeded his brother Andrea, who advanced the art still further. He ornamented the church of San Giovanni, at Florence, with statues and reliefs, and he it was who executed the oldest of those beautiful bronze doors of the Baptistery, which served as a model for all that is excellent, difficult, or beautiful in those made subsequently by Ghiberti.

From the Pisan school, and from Sienna as well, the new impulse rapidly spread. The only indications, in painting, of these early tendencies toward a better style of art are to be found in the works of certain miniature-painters, illuminators of missas, chiefly monks, who became somewhat skilled in the use of color.

The advance in sculpture was followed by improvements in mosaic, a process of art in which glass and stones of various colors are employed for pictorial purposes. The walls, ceilings, and pavements of early cathedrals were chiefly decorated by this means, which afterwards gave place to fresco for mural decoration.

With the birth of Cimabue, in 1240, a new epoch was in store for painting, for he it was who first unfolded the true powers of this art which arrived at perfection in the sixteenth century, and which placed painting at the head of the arts as an expressive language of sensible forms. With Cimabue and his Florentine successors painting rapidly developed as a fine art. Cimabue rapidly outgrew his Greek instructors; he discarded their practice of adhering stupidly to traditional types without in any way endeavoring to better or perfect them. By consulting nature he attempted to vary his forms and to give expression to his heads.

At this time pictorial art was chiefly confined to mural paintings in fresco. Panels were sometimes used for altar-pieces, prepared with a surface of gypsum, which practice was continued until the invention of oil-painting, by John Van Eyck, in 1410—Cimabue was born about a century and a half previous to this. The process of painting on a surface of lime, which afforded a smooth, white, absorbent ground, was termed *tempera;* the colors were applied with gums. The process commonly

miscalled *fresco* at this day, with us, is really *tempera* painting—*fresco* being a process of painting in water-colors on fresh *wet* plaster, while *tempera* is painting with colors mixed with size on a *dry* surface.

Many works of the old painters, even down to a late period, were executed in tempera, which, being afterwards oiled or varnished, acquired almost the character and brilliancy of oil-paintings. Tempera painting is the process employed in painting scenes for the theatres. Fresco is now seldom or never practised, altho there have been in recent years several important attempts to revive the art.

It may be well to narrate here an incident which led to the discovery of oil-painting, by John Van Eyck, since this method has become, until quite recently, almost the universal practice among artists. We have seen what were the methods of tempera painting; but it remains to be said that after the completion of the picture by this process, a kind of varnish was applied requiring a certain degree of heat to enable it to dry and harden.

Van Eyck, an artist of distinguished merit, and founder of the Flemish school, having worked for a long time on a picture, and having finished it with great care, placed it in the sun to dry, when the board on which it was painted split. His disappointment at seeing so much labor lost urged him to the discovery, by his knowledge of chemistry, of some process that would not in future expose him to a like risk. The result of his investigations brought him to the use of linseed or nut oil as a vehicle, either of which was found to be sufficiently siccative.

But to return to Cimabue, and the close of the thirteenth century. There was at this time no knowledge of perspective, or of foreshortening. A rigid and formal treatment of drapery prevailed, together with a general sameness in the attitudes; the eyes were almond-shaped; the hands lean, long, and devoid of character or expression; and the feet rested on the toes. It took nearly two centuries to perfect the art sufficiently to enable the artist to plant the feet of his figures squarely on the ground.

But with his imperfect art, Cimabue studied nature; executing a St. Francis for which he employed a living model—which was a new thing, and opposed to the system of his masters, who strictly, as I have said, adhered to tradition. Says Taine:

"To return to the living figure; to discern that in order to imitate the human form, it is necessary to contemplate the human form, what could be simpler?" Yet in this lay the gist of the Renaissance. This fact, simple as it is, furnishes a key to that great revival in art and letters which, beginning with Cimabue and Dante, flowed onward with ever-increasing beauty and power until it arrived at its flood in the sixteenth century.

Giotto, the contemporary and friend of Dante, followed Cimabue, whose pupil he was. Lanzi, the author of the best history of painting extant, writes: "If Cimabue was the Michael Angelo of that age, Giotto was the Raphael, as painting, in his hands, became so elegant that none of his school, nor of any other, until the time of Massaccio—a century later—surpassed or even equalled him, at least in gracefulness of manner." The formal attitudes, the long and meagre hands, the pointed feet and staring eyes—remnants of the Byzantine manner—all "acquired more correctness under him:" and this advance is attributed to his study of the antique, and to his frequent reference to the living model—for with Giotto portrait-painting began. He painted in his frescos, in the chapel of the Podesta, at Florence, the portraits of his friends, conspicuously Dante; also Latini and Donati. Thus this advance in the art may be attributed to the study of the newly discovered sculptures of the ancients, and of the living model. Nothing was wanting to the painters of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries than to learn that they had pursued a wrong path. This was sufficient to guide them into a better, and it was not then untried for sculpture had already, as we have seen, improved design.

Giotto carried the art to that degree of perfection which rendered painting an effective and elegant means of expressing ideas. He freed the art from those conventionalities that confined it to its previously narrow sphere of expression. Not only had Giotto ornamented the beautiful Campanile, adjoining the Duomo, at Florence, with sculptures and reliefs, designed by himself, tho executed by various sculptors, and representing the various arts and sciences, the cardinal virtues, and subjects illustrative of the temporal and spiritual life of man, but his enormously prolific genius covered the walls of many churches and other public buildings with frescos crowded with figures,

exhibiting a creative energy that has not since been surpassed in the history of art. The technical development of the art may be here briefly alluded to. At this time panels of hard wood were generally in use for painting upon: often surrounded with borders enclosing pieces of parchment or leather, upon which separate designs or ornaments were made. On whatever substance they painted, some gold was usually added; frequently as a background, also for the aureoles of saints, and to ornament draperies with graceful traceries and borders. Frequently these gold backgrounds were stamped with stars, flowrets, etc. The ground for mural paintings, in tempera, was prepared with a red wash, on which the design was drawn; and such walls were the cartoons of the old masters. Portable altar-pieces with folding wings, termed *ancone*, carved in the Gothic manner and richly painted with appropriate designs upon gilded grounds, were much in use. The practice of gilding the backgrounds of pictures declined towards the end of the fifteenth century, and soon after the application of gold-leaf was discontinued, even in its subordinate uses.

Giotto, however, worked mainly in fresco, upon works of vast extent. He founded new principles of art, and entitled the Florentine school to assert its supremacy. In regular and progressive sequence we may trace the development of fresco-painting through Giotto, Orcagna, Masolino, Massaccio, Angelico, Bartolommeo, and Andrea del Sarto to its complete perfection at the close of the sixteenth century—as exemplified in the works of Michael Angelo in the Sistine Chapel, and Raphael in the Stanzas of the Vatican.

The artists of this period evinced a remarkable universality of talents. They frequently excelled in several arts at the same time; in sculpture, architecture, and painting, also in working in the precious metals. Thus the Campanile, previously alluded to, in Florence, was designed by Giotto, and as a work of architecture nothing of the kind has ever since equalled it in beauty of design and workmanship. The variety and excellence of the work of individual artists of this period is attributed to the universality of the principles taught, and this made the transition from one art to another easy.

But in many things the followers of Giotto still retained

conventional traits, altho the art was being rapidly freed from them. In chiaroscuro and perspective, more particularly, little progress was made. Pietro della Francesca, who lived at the close of the fifteenth century, was the first who revived the Grecian practice of rendering geometry subservient to the painter. He rediscovered the science of perspective, which had been totally lost. The Pompeiian frescos show with what perfection it was practised by the ancients, but all knowledge of it had totally expired until revived by Francesca. Brunelleschi, an architect of great skill, who raised the dome of the cathedral at Florence, was one of the earliest to discover the method of perfecting this science; but it was reserved for Paolo Uccello, assisted by the mathematician Manetti, to reduce it to rules and render it available for the painter. As lineal perspective enables the painter to hollow fictitious depths on a smooth surface, and represent receding objects and spaces accurately, as they would appear to the eye, we may see what an important contribution this knowledge was toward perfecting the art. Hitherto the figures were distributed over the picture without distinction of planes, not unlike the present practice of Chinese art.

It was reserved for Leonardo da Vinci to perfect the arrangement of the lights and shadows in a picture comprehended in the term *chiaroscuro*, which was afterwards brought to still higher perfection with greater scope by Rembrandt. Leonardo was the early pupil of the sculptor Verocchio, and while under his tuition he conceived the practice of modelling clay statuettes of the figures he contemplated painting in his pictures. These he draped with wet linen, and in drawing from them he imitated their relief. He thus imbibed the sentiment of solid substance, and carried this sentiment into painting. He worked with great patience, ever aiming at perfection, and producing but few pictures; spending, it is said, four years on a single portrait, that known as the "Mona Liza," and leaving it still unfinished. Leonardo was continuously meditating upon the means of perfecting his art. At Milan he remained for some years engaged in abstruse studies, and during this time he painted but little, occupying himself with presiding over an academy of the fine arts. But he left, it is said, a degree of refinement in Milan so productive of illustrious pupils that this period may be regarded as

perhaps the most glorious era of his life. His one great work while there was the celebrated *Cenacolo*, or Last Supper, upon which he labored for sixteen years.

Whatever was most difficult in art had for Leonardo a special interest. Not only did he bring to perfection that element of art termed *chiaroscuro*, by a knowledge of which he was enabled to produce brilliant effects through contrasting the lights in the picture with vast spaces of shade; but through marvellously fine gradations he made his figures appear to stand out in relief in a substantial way. He likewise brought to perfection *foreshortening*—the representation of objects of irregular form as seen obliquely, as, for instance, an arm that is pointing toward the observer. But while Leonardo thus perfected the technical methods of the art, he never lost sight of those higher values that render painting emotional and expressive. Nothing has ever surpassed the expression he has given to the heads in his *Cenacolo*, nor can we conceive of a more adequate representation of an event, the sublimest in history, as concentrated in that instant when the Apostles unite in asking the momentous question, "Is it I?"

With Leonardo, therefore, the art culminates, technically, in perfection. Painting, tho it was reserved for the Venetians to give it greater freedom and power, was now capable of expressing all the emotions of the soul by means of the realities of nature, represented on a smooth surface by their forms and colors. The technical, or instrumental, means had been perfected, and it only remained to develop and expand the style.

Pietro Perugino, the master of Raphael, was born about the same time as Leonardo da Vinci; they both were pupils of Verocchio. To understand that enlargement of style, and the freedom of execution, practised by Raphael after he had seen the works of Michael Angelo, we should study his early works, those which exhibit the influence of Perugino, his master. Perugino was a painter of great excellence; sincere and earnest in his endeavor to make his art serve a fine inspiration, and the expression of some of his heads are fully equal to, if indeed they do not surpass, many of Raphael's.

It is a common practice among critics in discussing Raphael's art to allude to his freeing himself from the narrow, restricted

influence of Perugino. The truth is that Raphael owed more than is generally conceded to this very influence; and fortunately he never entirely obliterated the impulse he derived from Perugino. His early works show that he imitated the style of his master very closely. Until he went to Rome, where he saw the works of Michael Angelo, he was entirely under the influence of Perugino. That early influence was invaluable to him, and it was perhaps to this, in part, that he owed the peculiar charm of expression we see in the heads of many of his Madonnas.

Coming in contact later with the works of Michael Angelo, executed with the freedom and breadth that resulted in greater simplicity and power, he derived from the latter what he recognized as most valuable, and thus he enlarged his views and simplified his style. But while he derived from those about him what served his own ends, he himself supplied the true inspiration that has accorded him the unstinted homage of mankind.

Oil-painting had been introduced into Italy early in the fifteenth century by Antonello da Messina, who, having heard of Van Eyck's practice, went to Belgium and became his pupil. On the death of Van Eyck, Antonello had returned to Rome, making known the new practice on his way, both at Venice and at Florence. Thus Leonardo and Perugino had availed themselves of this method, and Raphael found the means perfected to his use. Oil-painting was generally adopted for small pictures, but for large mural paintings fresco was regarded as alone suitable.

It is said that Raphael was once present at the opening of an ancient sarcophagus, and observing that the linen cloths used in burial remained free from decay—as may be seen in the windings of Egyptian mummies—he adopted such cloths for painting upon, as being more durable than panels of wood, and less liable to suffer from variations of temperature or from the worm. Thus prepared canvas was eventually substituted for wooden panels for oil-paintings, and in Venice this was generally employed, even for very large paintings; in one instance, by Tintoretto, for a picture above eighty feet long by thirty high.

With respect to the improvement in style, we have seen that while Perugino's figures have a tranquil, meditative expression,

Raphael added to this forms of greater amplitude and greater freedom of action.

With reference to the expression of art previous to Raphael, we find that religious sentiment was purer, in the sense of being more strictly conformed to Christian ideas as then understood. With Raphael and Michael Angelo, and their successors, the Christian idea commingles with pagan sentiment. Previous to Raphael the conceptions of the painters exhibited a naïve simplicity and purity of feeling that we cannot but respect and admire as a distinct phase of art. With the revival of classical studies this was greatly changed. In the frescos of Michael Angelo and Raphael we find the pagan and Christian world blended as one. They conceived of Christian civilization as uniting in one vast, unbroken, onward movement the intellectual harvests of the past, upon which was engrafted the new and richer development of the present. Thus in Raphael's Stanzas of the Vatican we find his "School of Athens" over against the "Dispute of the Sacraments," his "Apollo seated on Parnassus" in close proximity to works illustrative of Christian belief. And in Michael Angelo's "Last Judgment," above is the Christ denouncing the damned, and below is Charon ferrying his passengers across the Styx—united in one composition. Dante largely inspired this mixed sentiment, which, however, did not manifest itself completely, or forcibly, until the time of Michael Angelo. In acquiring a mastery over his art, Michael Angelo devoted himself persistently to the study of anatomy for the space of twelve years, it is said, and the knowledge thus gained determined, in part, his style, his practice, and his fame. He painted but little, only three or four easel pictures, and these are barely authenticated. His great works in fresco are those upon the wall and ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, at Rome. The books from whence he drew his inspiration were the Bible, Dante, and Petrarch. He preferred that which bore the imprint of grandeur—the Old and New Testaments principally; but the terribly earnest discourses of Savonarola, his friend, had great influence upon him. He saw the latter tied to the pillory and burnt, and he declared that his living words would always remain in his soul.

In closing this brief sketch of the historic growth of painting

as a fine art, I have only space for slight reference to the practice of the Venetian painters, who were really the technical masters of this art. The Roman and Florentine schools were chiefly conspicuous for excellence of design, but the Venetians excelled in coloring and in facility of technical execution. They had acquired a certain superiority in manipulation, and a luxurious development in the tone and harmonies of coloring, that gave their art a rich, sensuous charm peculiarly their own. It was a common practice at that period—the close of the fifteenth century—to prepare, as we have seen, with a lime surface the altar-pieces and panels that were to be painted upon ; and this white ground was considered favorable to every variety of tint laid upon it, and particularly for obtaining a certain transparency in the shadows. But that which was peculiar to the Venetian practice was that their effects were produced not so much by a strong layer of pigment as by repeated overlaying of thin color, termed *glazing*, requiring a manipulation surprisingly skilful and rapid, which heightened the brilliancy of the luminous qualities and added great richness and depth to the tones, at the same time retaining the purity of the tints without blemish —a result which requires no less promptness of hand than of intellect, besides education and a taste thoroughly cultivated. Nor was the harmony and contrast of color so well understood as by them. Their marvellous taste for arranging and assimilating the tones and qualities of color in either a high or extremely low key was apparently a matter of instinct, not due to education, as Lanzi suggests, but rather to the artistic flowering of their *milieu;* Venice, above all other places, especially under the luxurious civilization of the time, and from its atmosphere and natural surroundings, being pre-eminently qualified to inspire sensations of extrême richness in color, analogous to the grandest orchestral harmonies of sound in the symphony. Bellini, Giorgione, Palma Vecchio, Titian, Tintoretto, and Paul Veronese are the great luminaries of Venetian art. While delighted with the luxurious wealth, the opulent charm of coloring, in the works of these masters, there is always something still which inspires reverie, and we grow meditative under their skilful blending of the sensuous and the thoughtful.

We have seen, in this rapid survey of painting in its technical

growth, that the art was dependent upon two prominent causes for its advancement; viz., a return to the study of nature under the guidance of ancient Greek art, and a general advance in scientific knowledge. So long as art follows in the ruts of mere tradition it can never be otherwise than conventional and formal. When, under the inspirations of nature, it aims to express the emotional experience of healthy, living beings of the present, it follows a true instinct.

JOHN F. WEIR.

CHURCH ECONOMICS.

MANY years ago the present writer edited a monthly periodical intended to strengthen an earnest church, then in too little contact with other branches of the Christian family, but willing enough to consider suggestions from any reputable quarter. A correspondence appeared in its pages on the duty of a community, situated as is the Irish Presbyterian Church, to provide for its orphans. To many the idea appeared interesting and creditable to its advocates, but impracticable. Fifteen years have passed, and, mainly through the honest toil of a minister, the Rev. Dr. William Johnston, and it is fair to add, his wife, that church—of nearly six hundred congregations—has now an organization and a fund through which any honest Presbyterian parents can be assured that if God in his providence removed them from their young children, they would be educated, cared for, and given such a start in life as their parents if spared would have tried to afford them. This and kindred arrangements give a real meaning to the phrase "mother church," and well represent to her poorest members the sympathy and the care of the Church's head,—an aspect in which it has been the glory of the Presbyterian Church to present the Divine Redeemer. Encouraged by this fragment of a history, the writer ventures to offer a few suggestions which, tho primarily contemplating the organization to which he has hereditary and fond attachment, are yet capable of application, for the most part, to other portions of the great and growing family of Christ. They are offered as suggestions, not as matured plans, and without overweening confidence or such paternal partiality as would resent the idea of modifications, possible improvements, or even absolute rejection.

One other prefatory statement may be pardoned. The churches of America are not to be supposed to lie under censure if the fact is made clear that some things that might be, have not yet been, realized. Considering how young some of them are, how youthful the country is, how wide the spaces to be covered with church machinery, and how varied the elements to be worked upon, the wonder to all candid and educated persons will be that so much has been effected. The erection of edifices; the establishment of a religious press that is the wonder of Christendom; the founding of schools, colleges, and seminaries; the shaping of boards, and the maintenance of a high order of Christian literature—these attest the marvellous activity which the blessing of God has given to American Protestantism. Not to call into existence, therefore, but to encourage and guide enormous and blessed forces, and certainly not to reflect upon the past as if it had been lost, is the object of this article.

In an average American town an active minister is compelled to expatiate over the greater part of its streets, avenues, and squares. He must follow his people, see them in their homes, visit the sick, look after the poor, and bury the dead. A certain proportion of time, energy, and even cost of locomotion, is thus demanded, which would be saved if his people were within a definite district. A certain law of affinities now makes, and will continue to make, this in a degree necessary. Even in British cities where the parochial system prevails there has long existed a free-church system, with churches so described, not because they are free in the matter of expense,—that applies rather to parish churches,—but free of the rigid control exercised over the parish churches, and free in that the seat-holders choose their own pastor. In many cities the best attended and most popular and influential churches have been of this character, and the worshippers have come from many and widely different parishes. But wise and observant men, with a view to minimize the interference with generally useful and fixed arrangements, have been laboring to assign districts to such churches, as nearly as possible like parishes, so as to give to the clergy a sense of responsibility for the people of the district, and to the people a sense of right in the clergy and claim to their services.

Something of this kind might be advantageously done by

American churches. Each denomination might district a town or a city, assigning to each congregation its portion of territory, the dwellers on which would be, if not attached to another congregation, its charge, and taught to feel that they had a presumptive right to the services of its minister. The idea of a definite and manageable territory is not only helpful, it is stimulating to the mind of a clergyman. He despairs over the vague and inaccessible space which is traversed alike by himself and by several other clergymen who happen to have "hearers," as he has, scattered around promiscuously. Give him a fixed and not hopelessly large section, let him know that for all of his denomination, or of no denomination within it, who are not definitely provided for in other churches, he is responsible, and you lead him naturally to say, "This is my part of the field. I must cultivate it to the best of my power, gather out the weeds, plant the good seed, and watch over its growth." To drop the figure and be practical: he will think of making a census of the people; of accomplishing a visitation of all the dwellings by himself or his fellow-laborers; of keeping an eye on nuisances, social or otherwise, and eliminating them; of drawing the untaught children under good influences, and bringing the classes of the district into healthy mutual contact; while all learn to look to him as a common friend, and to the place of worship as the centre of beneficent influences felt over all the region. Ministers being men before their ordination, and carrying the human element along with them into parochial work, will feel a certain healthy stimulus from the improving condition of the districts around them; and even the people will not be entirely unmoved by the spectacle. Nor would any clergyman's real influence for good suffer if he was heard saying in all sincerity to good Mr. Smith: "I should be happy to have you, of course, but my brother, Mr. Thompson, in whose district you reside, is as good a clergyman as you can have, and you would get good and do good by falling into the line of worshippers and workers with him." The popular theory is that the chief aim of a minister is to get a crowd of followers; any policy that dispels this illusion is beneficial in the long-run. A division of our territory in towns, and in time in the country, into as close an approach to parishes as once existed in New England, and for the pur-

poses above indicated, with others which we do not delay to specify, is the first suggestion towards the higher utilization of our resources.

It is not a long stride from the foregoing to the providing of an official residence for the ministry. In many instances, of course, congregations are amply able to do this for themselves, and it would be as economical usually for the community as it is for the individual to own the residence, which must be provided in one form or other. If the minister is to be maintained by the people for the doing of their work, he must be given a house, or the means to pay for one. It would be cheaper in the majority of cases, to have the house for him as the congregation's property. In many instances congregations would require external aid, as in the erection of the church edifice, and then a scheme for "parsonages," "manses," or whatever other name may be deemed best for clergymen's official residences, would be as fitting as a Board of Church Erection, of whose operations, in point of fact, this might become an extension. Among the benefits which far more than counterbalance incidental and occasional disadvantages, some fall among the people, and some into the hands of the clergy. Residence within easy distance of the church and in the district is ordinarily secured. There may be some cases where this would involve sacrifices; but it is fairly open to question if a minister should not endure them. A missionary living five miles from his field, and coming on given days of the week to his "office" for some hours, was known to the present writer; but his influence was slight and his incumbency brief. When a new minister comes to a congregation it is a nice and delicate question where he will settle. In the "genteel" part of the town? Then the common folk imagine a great gulf fixed between him and them. In the plainer part of it? Then the "genteel" folk feel as if he cut himself off from them, and indeed reflected in some degree on their liberality and the standing of the congregation. But let there be a residence provided, and the minister has no care at the time when all his energies and thoughts are needed for his new work; and he can no more be criticised than the President for living in the White House, or the governor of the State in the official residence. In time the manse comes to have many

a sacred memory connected with it, suggestive to its inhabitants and to its visitors. "Here is where Alexander," or Hodge, or McIlvaine, or Bacon, or Payson "studied, prayed, and talked with many a soul about Christ and eternal life." The minister who would not feel an inspiration from such a memory must be exceptionally constituted. In time a library belonging to the manse might spring up, and the minister's dear study companions, instead of being flung around at his death for half their worth from an auctioneer's bench, go to his successor. Property is increasing in value over four fifths of this continent, and as a rule money laid out in such ways would be a good and profitable investment. A man settled in a house where his children were born, whence, perhaps, some of them went to the mansions above, where his wife's hand and taste were conspicuous in a thousand little arrangements and practical ingenuities, would be less of a bird of passage than a lodger, boarder, or tenant, and something would be done toward longer pastorates, which in the end will be found a gain in a settled and orderly community. But even on the rotating plan, as our Methodist brethren well know, the official residence would be a prudent investment, and an increase of power for good to the congregation.

If it be alleged that in some instances ministers, being unmarried, would not require homes, it is sufficient to say that a celibate clergy is never encouraged in Protestantism, and that in many instances the temptation to this undesirable and incomplete state of existence would be diminished by the providing of a home in which "the Bishop" could set the example of a blameless home-life with his helpful wife, and their children in subjection. One pure and godly home, in the nature of the case under the eyes of a whole district, is itself an elevating force that is not to be despised. One other consideration only we shall indicate as applying to the newer regions of the country. When a minister goes to a town, hires a "hall," and boards at the hotel, the average townsman looks on him as making an experiment, and holds aloof till he sees how the thing is going to work. But if the minister and his adherents set about the erection of a church—building an official residence for the pastor—there is a very articulate language in the step. It is practically to say to the citizen: We have come here, and we

mean to stay; if we *are* weak, there is a sympathetic and self-denying strong body behind us; if you think of joining us, you may as well join us now as later. This unspoken message is intelligible to the average American.

While glancing at the material resources of a congregation, it is not quite out of place to allude to a feeling which may be in other minds as strongly as in the writer's, and which finds indefinite expression in view of neat, attractive, and often costly church-buildings. What a pity that they cannot be utilized to a greater extent during the week! Yet there are difficulties in practice. We have in most of the Protestant churches no consecration of a formal kind; but there is the sacredness of uses and of associations which we would not willingly ignore. The best people feel an incongruity between the social amusements of life and the worship of the Lord's day in the same "audience-chamber"—to employ for once a bad phrase that indicates hearing as the great business of the assembled worshippers. It is difficult enough for most persons, and especially for the young, with rapidly moving minds, to concentrate the thoughts on the exercises of the holy day; but if to the common distracting forces there be added memories of social encounters, droll situations, amusing comicalities, recalled by pew and platform, the difficulty is increased. On this account we would have the church proper as far as possible reserved for church uses—for praise, prayer, preaching, sacraments, and kindred services such as evangelistic and missionary gatherings. But where there are lecture and Sabbath-school rooms annexed, it is surely wise to connect them as far as possible with the week-day life of the people. Why should not a working-men's club be accommodated? Why should not a reading-room invite the young men who, poorly lodged, lounge about in the evenings when free from work and gravitate towards undesirable places? Why should not the people of the congregation place there the reading matter which is sometimes a sore vexation to the orderly housekeeper when it has done its work? As to Ladies' Employment Societies, Missionary Unions, and the like, there is no need to write. But the Kindergarten, the Loan Fund Committee, the Dorcas Society, and even the cooking-class, might well enough find space under the hospitable roof of the lecture-

room, and some, who otherwise would not learn it, may thus find the way to the church, and the feeling may be fixed in the popular mind that the church stands for all humanizing, elevating and helpful forces. This would give trouble and cost something, it may be said. Granted; but it would be worth all the cost in the fruits. It is worth while to bridge over the chasm between the non-pew-owners and the church; and it is all the more needed in a land like ours—committed, and rightfully committed, to the voluntary system, and the separation of Church and State.

To present a single example: in a neighborhood where there is a large proportion of working-men a minister with two good qualities—manliness and common-sense—helps them to form a "mutual benefit club." It is so arranged that the modest weekly subscription will give relief to sick members, and afford a needed donation to a family when death saddens the home. It provides, perhaps, a cheerful room with heat, light, and reading matter for the members in the evenings. It is accommodated by the church. It has a monthly meeting for business, and for quiet talks. The minister is a great but unostentatious force in it. His hand does not disdain that of the carpenter, the miner, or even the hod-carrier. He is there a man among men, a working-man among his fellows. There are times for kindly, solemn, divine words. The wires of sincere social sympathy are being stretched from his heart to theirs, and when the strain comes, through them the light and heat of heavenly fires can run. "We are in trouble, wife; Janie looks as if she were not long for this world; the minister, where I am going to-night, is a kind man; I think I'll tell him about our Janie." And he does; a responsive word cheers him; a kindly visit to his lowly home brings God and all good near to the family; another brings the saving truth to the mind of sinking Janie; the father is there, sometimes, when the prayer by her bedside seems to lift her and her worn-out mother to the gate of heaven. The hand hardened with toil goes up again and again to wipe away the tears—why shed, he cannot tell. No more can he explain the calm which comes to him when the minister speaks simple words of truth and tenderness over the pale still form of Janie. Henceforth the minister and the cause he repre-

sents are linked in the mind of Janie's father with her dear image and memory; and when he says, "Wife; I'd like to go to the church, Sunday," and he goes, and hears, and gets memorable glimpses of the heavenly world, what is it but the electric energy, which God and not man made, running along fitting channels which man—Christian and wise—has been slowly preparing? And such results are reached with men who otherwise would be approached by the selfish agitator, and welcomed into the drinking-place and solaced with cards, dice, and rum; the divine ministry of grace is honored, society is helped, and an ample reward is had for care, thought, money, and personal labor. One may grow morbidly afraid of threatening class divisions in a country like ours, especially if the numerous happy family ceased to be well fed; but aside from its value as a preventive and protective policy, sustained effort like this yields a present return a hundred-fold.

Passing now to another aspect of church economics, we venture a word regarding the needed aid to a proportion of the candidates for the ministry. And to avoid misapprehension, let us say at the outset three things. (*a*) A proportion of most desirable aspirants to the sacred office require and should receive pecuniary aid. (*b*) Every college-bred man is indebted to a certain extent to eleemosynary aid in the buildings, in the foundations, endowments, library, and other elements of college equipment. But it is not felt in the same sense in which a hundred dollars a year given to the student is felt to be eleemosynary. (*c*) The need of artificial arrangements of the beneficiary kind, through which many admirable men have been helped in their early career, ought to be less and less with growing educational facilities and increasing means and forms of employment not incompatible with the prosecution of college studies. In no spirit of reflection on the past, therefore, and in no heartless disregard of the honorable aspirations of struggling young men in the present, is an alteration in the plan of educational funds suggested. On the present plan, a youth who is deemed a desirable person to be encouraged to study for the ministry is awarded, simply on the ground of this favorable estimate, a certain sum of money—not always enough to do more than supplement his means. It may turn out that he does not in the

end prosecute his studies. He may not develop the intellectual or the moral qualities of which he gave promise and on the ground of which the aid was very properly given. Church courts are likely to consider, when a candidate is presented with some less hopeful elements in his examinations, that he has been counted exceptionally zealous and earnest or he would not have been taken up by their boards; and furthermore, that so much having been invested in him already, it is a pity to throw it away by discouraging him. It is not to the discredit of kind-hearted churchmen that they feel these considerations. And in a certain proportion of the recipients of such aid a sense of dependence is produced. In a certain proportion the spirit of self-reliance is less cultivated than it might otherwise be. In a certain proportion of cases the beneficiary is tempted to say within himself, "The church took me up, took me out of the store or off the farm, and the church is bound to take care of me." And finally, a certain proportion of students in our colleges, whose friends take care of them, knowing as they do, of course, of the beneficiary arrangements for theological students, are tempted to say to themselves and to one another, "I am not going with that crowd," and to turn away from any consideration of the claims of the ministry on them. It is true, if all were deeply spiritual, or felt as many do regarding the system, they would not so reason, nor would the occasional evils above named arise. But we have to do not with the ideal but with the actual young man, and a wise ecclesiastical statesmanship takes account of human nature as it is.

Suppose, however, that the money, instead of being given in sums of a hundred or two hundred dollars to students commended as hopeful candidates, were formally and openly designated as a "foundation," "bursary," or "scholarship" available for the reward of progress that reached a certain standard, not even excluding the competitive element. The successful man receives the money with no loss of self-respect, but rather with the legitimate feeling of having earned it. He does not go out of the category of ordinary students, for it was open to them all to compete for the substantial reward. He prosecutes his studies under the influence of an honorable stimulus, and the very money he wins and uses, instead of lowering, raises him in

the eyes of his fellow-students. In the operation of a system of which this arrangement would be the feature, accuracy of knowledge and thoroughness of examination would become a necessity. Goodness of heart would not offset defective preparation; the standard of ministerial education would, to say the least, not be lowered; and the standing of the clergy would be raised—itself a most desirable object.

Objections to this will, of course, occur to any one familiar and content with the existing system. It may be alleged that the proposed plan leaves young men to get ready for college without aid, and so works badly at the outset. But in point of fact only a small proportion of beneficiaries receive aid before entering college, and in law and medicine there is no want of candidates, the standard of admission being the same to them as to intending theological students. There is no fund of which we know for youths who aspire to be lawyers or doctors.

It may be feared that the operation of such a plan as this would, in the first instance, diminish the number of candidates for the ministry, and so embarrass the churches and impede the noblest of all work. To this it is sufficient to reply that the change should be made gradually, and in such a way as to carry along the intelligent sympathy of ministers, church courts, colleges, and parents disposed to encourage their sons to seek the noblest of offices. And it is not, perhaps, too much to say that a certain temporary reduction of the candidates for pulpits might not be a serious evil. Congregations, in too many cases, are demoralized on the subject of ministerial maintenance by the number of competitors painfully within their reach, and a pressure in any direction that would force the question away from the calculations of trustees, "On how little can he live?" would be a clear gain.

It would involve, some may think, the creation of much new machinery and the abandonment of some of the old. This is not, however, necessary. Let a denomination that spends, say, fifty thousand dollars a year on the existing plan turn in this much money annually to its colleges and seminaries, in which all the appliances for its custody and application already exist, and the work is done. The agencies for raising the funds may remain unaltered, and it is not improbable that larger contributions

would be given, when it is well understood that a high standard of scholarship is a *sine qua non* to the enjoyment of the money. The limits of an article preclude the further discussion of details.

From this part of our educational machinery it is no violent transition to the institutions of learning themselves. Whether a large number of small colleges and seminaries, or a smaller number of large, is the better plan in the end, is a vexed question, with weighty authorities on both sides. Probably the circumstances of the advocates, as they happen to be in old and established or in new and struggling institutions, exercise a real tho not consciously recognized influence on their minds. On this question we do not enter. The decision does not affect the view we venture to express, namely, that money and resources are in danger of being wasted on the present system. Suppose a denomination has five millions a year to give to education? It is surely wise to lay it out, not where there may happen to be zealous and urgent educators pushing their claims, but where it is the most needed, has the widest influence and the best promise of continuance. A volunteer force in the States and Territories in war time would best serve the country by being under the direction of a war-office or a commander-in-chief who surveyed the whole field, saw where ground is to be taken or kept, where a blow is to be struck or a weak spot defended. The same principle surely applies here. Churches commonly receive and pass upon reports from the institutions they sustain. A committee of men familiar with such forms of work might well be constituted, charged with the examination of the whole field, the selection of new centres, the removal, if necessary, of existing appliances to better fields, and indeed all the action necessary to get the most for the present and the future from the millions devoted to this end. The "parochial mind," while sound and clear on what affects the internal affairs of the parish, is not certain to take a wise and dispassionate view of what is for the good of a church stretching, as most of our great churches do, across a continent. Lest we should seem to prejudge some particular case, let an example be taken from another department. A church edifice is to be built in a new settlement. There are competing sites. One is central, and likely to be so always. The other is on one side, but a well-to-do member will

give it free of cost and a good subscription to boot. It is chosen; but five years have not passed until its out-of-the-way situation makes the building of another a necessity. A little money was saved in the first instance; but it was "penny-wise, pound-foolish" economy in the end. So it may well enough be in colleges and even seminaries. We have lived through the Log-cabin college era. We have reached the stage when organization, contemplating the permanent needs of a great whole, is required. That an excellent man gives his house and time for a college, and asks for the public support, is not by itself any adequate reason for giving it. The inadequacy, uncertainty of the issue, infelicity of place, and inevitable personal elements introduced by the history, may be a positive discouragement to subsequent and wise efforts. A great element in the apparatus of a great Christian body should not be dependent on the fortuitous tact, ability, or perseverance of a college agent. It should have the intelligent sanction of a competent and trusted board, representing and considering the whole, and so be able to rely on the practical co-operation of the whole. No well-governed kingdom is defended by fortresses put up at the public cost where a farmer happens to offer ground, or a builder finds time and stone on his hand. A competent authority determines strategic points. The children of light ought to be as wise in their administration as the children of this world.

We ought to add, that with the foresight which, in many things, has marked New England, a "college society" on the the lines indicated has long been in existence within its territories. Whether it has realized all the advantages which its founders contemplated, we are not able to say; but of the capabilities of such an agency there can be no reasonable doubt. The Protestant churches, notwithstanding all the one-sided reflections upon them as if in an obstinate conflict with science, are, and have been, the best, wisest, and most self-denying friends of high education. There is not the least reason to apprehend their abandonment of this field of labor for human good; and it is of the utmost moment that their gifts, sympathies, and efforts should be not only inspired by the loftiest aims, but that they should be directed and utilized by the best practical wisdom.

Before venturing another and final suggestion, one or two preliminary statements may be permitted to prepare the mind of the reader for its consideration.

(1) The management of common benevolent funds in the Protestant churches has been so prudent, economical, and successful as to bear comparison with that of corresponding secular associations. The openness, the well-defined responsibility, and the Christian character of the management have, under God's blessing, contributed to this result. There have been conspicuous losses suffered by too confiding persons, as in Cincinnati, but no such calamity has befallen Protestant contributors. No reasonable fear need be entertained of their fair reputation being forfeited.

(2) The clerical profession does not stand in the same position with that of law or medicine. No calculation is made as to lawyers' or doctors' fees, of the rates at which they who earned them can live. But this is all too often done with ministers. One result is that their facilities for providing "for their own," for orphans or widows, are few and limited. Any one who has watched, as the present writer has done for thirty years, the incomes and the families of ministers on both sides of the ocean; the victories over straitened means; the amount of money given away; the start in life afforded to the children; the decencies of life maintained under difficulties; and the general success in life of the children of the parsonage, will realize that "the blessing of the Lord, it maketh rich." But these compensations constitute no reason against the use of such wise and concerted measures as might lighten anxieties, lift Christian persons out of the category of receivers of bounty, and promote forethought and independence of feeling.

(3) There are insurance companies in abundance over the land, but a certain knowledge of business life is necessary to discriminate among them. Young ministers have not commonly that knowledge; and other objections, on which we need not linger, sometimes lie against their availing themselves of their advantages. The result is that in too many cases the early death of a minister leaves wife and children in want, only to be mitigated by the kindness of the congregation witnessing and sharing the bereavement, or by the donations of a precarious relief fund—

precarious in this regard, that its means commonly depend on fluctuating collections. How much trial gentle, refined, and reticent women have suffered in this way it is not difficult to imagine.

There is no practical difficulty in the way of a great church founding a Widows' Fund under any name that seems fit, to which every young minister may be enjoined to contribute a large sum in the first year of his pastorate, and a small annual subscription during his life, from the proceeds of which an annuity may be paid his widow, if in God's providence he should leave a widow, during her life, and his children until they have reached the years of self-support. Such a fund would in time be the recipient of donations and bequests; but apart from this it would become at an early period adequate to the securing of bereaved families from dependence, and of maintaining in the minds of the bereaved the sense of self-respect and assured freedom from want. The payment of a large sum in the outset is practicable, because, ordinarily, a young minister is then unmarried, and can easily live on less than at a later time. Nor would it be an evil if in many cases he had to defer the joys and cares of a household owing to this very obligation. By the time he could prudently become the head of a house he would have acquired some degree of that practical knowledge of the world and of life's details which one does not secure commonly in a seminary. If it be alleged that some ministers do not marry or leave dependants, then on this plan they contribute so much to the comfort and advantage of their brethren in their peace of mind, and in the provision for their children. This membership, not being dependent on a particular congregation, nor a continued large payment, would be easily kept up; and it would be no slight relief to many a hard-worked Christian lady to know that if God took her husband, she would not have the cross of want added to the sorrow of widowhood.

JOHN HALL.

THE COLLAPSE OF FAITH.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WE resume the discussion commenced in the last number.

III. Leaving the unbelief of the agnostic and materialistic types, with their ethical corollaries, we proceed to those forms which question or lower *personality in both God and man*, and inquire as to the hold which they have upon the speculative and practical thinking of the present generation. Under this grouping, pantheism and naturalistic deism are placed side by side, so far as the doctrine of God is concerned. So far as we have to do with man and God's relations to man, the supernatural is excluded alike by each. Miracle, inspiration, providence, prayer, personal sympathy and help from God are all rejected or vaguely and faintly believed. The question which we propose to answer is this: Has the alleged collapse of faith proceeded farther in these directions in the present generation than ever before? or, on the other hand, are there signs of recovery and reaction? In reply to this question, we cannot deny that faith in the personality of God has been greatly weakened by the indefinite haziness into which the idea of God is resolved by the pantheistic metaphysics or overlaid by pantheistic imagery. The same result has followed the remoteness of distance to which the Supreme is removed by the complicated machinery of forces and laws which the deism of the mechanical physics interposes between man and his Maker, or the unfeeling indifference to human interests which Epicurean culture and dilettanteism ascribe to the Deity.

But when we ask whether pantheism or deism or Epicureanism are stronger in evidence or argument than they were in the

last generation, or are rooted more firmly in the rational convictions of the thinkers of the present day than in days gone by, we find no evidence that either is true. The bewildering wonder evoked by the pantheistic metaphysics seems to us to be giving way to a soberer and clearer philosophy of the Infinite. The imaginative tendency which was satisfied with the brilliant turnings of the kaleidoscope is beginning to find the sharp-cut visions of the telescope more restful to the eye. In the judgment of the cool and well-instructed intellect, personality, in both Creator and the created ranks higher than any quantity of matter or energy of force or complexity of laws. It is now more than suspected that the intelligent direction of forces to definite ends is a nobler function than unconscious subjection to either blind force or uninstructed law. Self-existence is less of an offence to the clearest and coolest intellects when affirmed of a Person whose resources are within himself and consciously known to himself, than when affirmed of unnumbered particles of star-dust that happen to find themselves together in such relations as to constitute a kosmos in embryo, with the promise and potency of a wondrous history. A deity who is capable of sympathy and care for beings who in turn can remember or forget him stands far higher in dignity and is far more worthy to be believed in, than a something or somewhat who is too imbecile or too dignified to respond to the longings of the human heart. It would seem that it is beginning to be discovered that the pantheist has exhausted all there is of argument in the assumption that Infinitude excludes any division or separateness of being, or in the vastness of the finite as revealed by modern science, or in the mystery of organic dependence and activity by which parts and wholes share and contribute to a common life. The deist of the mechanical philosophy is becoming rather tired of a God who having made and continuing to uphold the universe, and after an intelligent plan, is condemned to be a mere inspector of its workings, with no opportunity for that personal agency which begets personal trust or submission or comfort or hope. A special providence and a prayer-hearing and prayer-answering Father in heaven would bring some relief from the stupidity and tiresome monotony of a god so limited and inert. Even the Epicurean dilettante is so desirous of a new sensation as almost to be ready to

welcome it in the form of the hope of a heaven of established holiness and the fear of a hell of matured and energetic depravity.

We do not contend that there is any general or formal abandonment of either the pantheistic or the deistic theories of the universe. We are also aware that the preoccupation of so many of the active-minded thinkers of the time with physical theories of society and history have had something to do with the ebbing tide of pantheistic and deistic theologies. We do not contend that the one class of these theories is greatly to be preferred to the other. But we find evidence that the logic of neither is invincible if men of similar gifts and culture so readily exchange the one for the other. We find also reason to believe that the truths which have satisfied the speculative and practical wants of many generations will gain a more favorable hearing and a kindlier reception so soon as the tide shall begin to ebb, as it surely will, from an atheistic science and philosophy. The clearness and severity of the processes which are enjoined in the physical sciences, the exactness of definition, the severity of crucial experiments, and the demand for general consistency with the experiences and observations of common life, are rapidly disciplining the present generation to habits of judgment and reasoning which are favorable to a philosophy which finds room for personality in man and the deity, and with personality opens the way for personal worship and communion between living men and the living God.

IV. But let all this be conceded, and let us assume that the old faith in God's personality and providence may resume its old place in the schools of philosophy and science—what shall we say of the old faith in the supernatural of *the Christian Scriptures and the Christian Church?* Is not faith in the supernatural and even in the providential of actual history becoming weaker and more vacillating than ever? Has not the new historical criticism given such deadly blows to the naïve confidence of men in the miraculous element of the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures that it must needs fall into a fatal collapse from which it can never again revive? Is it not as obvious as it is true, that from the days of Lessing to the days of Kuenen the traditional con-

fidence of the Christian Church in the Hebrew and Christian miracles has been gradually giving way before the searching scrutiny of scientific criticism until less of it than ever remains among leading scholars, and the little that survives is asserted in propositions of more indefinite vagueness and feebler energy than ever before? While it may be true that supernaturalism as a possible theory is coming more into fashion—and not always to its honor—are not Moses and Jesus fast becoming thoroughly *naturalized*, and by critical tendencies which cannot be resisted?

Of these assertions and the facts on which they rest the following may be taken as a truthful estimate. It is doubtless true that within the present century scientific criticism has been applied to every description of history as never before, and from this scrutiny sacred history could not and ought not to escape. While it is by no means true that sacred and critical learning were previously unknown, and while it perhaps might be shown that every one of the newest destructive theories had been broached and defended by earlier critics, it will not be denied that the learning of the last three generations, especially in history and philosophy, has become more exact and scientific, and consequently more trustworthy than ever before. A keener historical discernment, a more just and vivid imagination, and a more penetrating insight into causes and principles have certainly been applied to all historical conclusions whether the subject is sacred or secular. As a consequence, the old admiring credulity with which ancient life and ancient men and ancient institutions were almost worshipped, as something grandiose if not superhuman, has been abandoned if not shamed out of sight. The old legends have been read into common if not into vulgar prose, the ancient myths have lost their gorgeous coloring and their imposing drapery, and the most venerated personages have come down from the lofty pedestals on which they stood like statues, and been forced to try the common, and at times the awkward, gait of ordinary mortals. From this severe ordeal the ancient religions have in one sense suffered most, while in another sense they have suffered least. They are no longer any of them accounted for by deliberate knavery and conscious fraud as their sole or chief originators, but are largely

explained as the natural and necessary outgrowths of the sentiment of worship as it has wrought out for itself an objective symbolic environment from nature and history. It was natural and necessary that as these theories have been successively matured, they should be applied to the Christian history, including the life of Jesus and the origin of the Christian Church—preeminently to the supernatural element in the same—as possibly natural phenomena. What has been the result: and first on the positive side? In answer to this question we may confidently affirm, that so far as *the drapery* or *setting* of the supernatural are concerned, the confidence of men in its substantial exactness has been greatly increased. The geography, the chronology, the literature—the life-likeness of the story as we find it, and whatever else rewards the historic sense, or confirms the trustworthiness of the narrative, or connects it with accredited knowledge from other sources—have successfully withstood the ordeal; and the sacred story in all these particulars—the supernatural in it being excluded—is more real and more credible than before. Renan may be taken as in some respects the most plausible of the rejectors of the supernatural in this history; and yet he is the most positive and outspoken in asserting that the Gospels and Epistles, in the perfect verisimilitude of place and time, give the most decisive evidence of their early origin. All negative critics do not agree with Renan upon this point; but Renan has the advantage above them all in being more free from merely scholastic presuppositions and more open to the broader lights of common-sense. For the history of the first Christian centuries modern criticism has also rendered an inestimable service in sweeping away a vast amount of rubbish in respect to the supposed superhuman intelligence of the early believers, and their miraculous exemption from the frailties incident to their times, and to their inferior position in respect of culture, wealth, and political influence. In short, it has done for the beginnings of Christianity what a good field-glass achieves for a distant landscape—it has made every outline sharp and every color fresh and glowing, and the whole field of vision vivid with life and reality—none the less but all the more because it forces upon the eye the sticks and stones and mud and gravel and every variety of disagreeable literalness which a less fresh and realistic

vision would fail to represent at all. It certainly cannot be denied that the new criticism has brought into very distinct and prominent relief the human side of the Gospel and early Christian history. But what has it done for the supernatural element? How has that been affected by the new and fresh lights which have been poured upon the past? Has the miraculous disappeared under the lights which modern science has focussed into these vivid pictures? As the vague has become distinct and the dim outlines have been sharpened and the distant has been brought near, has the supernatural vanished from the wondrous picture and "the splendid vision" of our reverent faith faded into the "light of common day"? To this question of questions but one answer can be given. Whether the supernatural vanishes out of sight or stands forth from the picture in bolder relief, depends on the eye that looks upon the picture more than upon the artist that uses the lens to bring it near. The sharper and more vivid setting of the past simply serves to bring the student of the present century into the immediate presence of the first, and to confront him face to face with the wondrous personage who is acknowledged to be the central figure in the wondrous story. It does for him the most that it can; for the frequent wish of the heart and intellect, either expressed or unexpressed, has invariably been, "Would that I had lived in the days of Christ, that I might see Him for myself and judge of Him by myself!" Modern criticism does this effectively, but it does no more. This is all that it can do, and all that it should promise to do. The literalness, the homeliness, and the entangledness of the natural with the human to the mind prepared to believe serves only to bring out more strikingly the supernatural and the divine in the picture. Over against this background of homely reality—made more homely just in proportion as it is made real—the supernatural Christ stands forth in a contrast so striking and with a relief so startling that the man prepared to believe says with a depth and fulness of conviction which the new criticism alone could make possible, "Never man spake like this man," "Truly this was the Son of God!"

Moreover, the new criticism has rendered a striking service to faith by the violent expedients to which it has driven the determined rejecters of the supernatural in their attempts to account

for Christ and Christianity on naturalistic principles. These expedients have demonstrated their own unsatisfactory and violent character by their uniform failure to satisfy a single generation or school of critics. In some instances, as is well known, they have been abandoned by their own originators. The naturalistic theory of Paulus, the mythical theory of Strauss, the tendency theory of Baur, the romantic theory of Renan, and the various mosaics or rather kaleidoscopic pictures made up of parts of each, have all failed permanently to answer the questions which the new criticism has forced upon the attention of men as never before. They have failed altogether to account for the origination and first triumphs of the gospel story on the supposition that the supernatural in it was false. It would seem as tho the entire round of possible negative hypotheses had been traversed by adventurous critics, to say nothing of sundry amazing aërial flights by manifest romancers, and in vain, and as tho nothing was left for the rejecters of supernatural Christianity except to select some one of the many paths which inevitably return upon themselves and end in disappointment and disgust.

We are fully aware that very many of the rejecters of the supernatural in the Christian history remain unconvinced, notwithstanding the confessed failures of these manifold negative theories. We know too well that incredulity in respect to the truth of the gospel history—if it should not rather be called the extreme of credulity—has become a fixed fashion or affectation in many cultivated circles. But we find no special strength, certainly no special novelty, in the arguments which they urge. Their attitude is not so much an attitude of conviction as of uncritical dogmatism which savors quite as much of scornful self-assertion as of docile and open-minded readiness to revise the fashionable opinions of a coterie, or to rouse themselves to fresh and earnest investigation. If to be willing to revise one's creed is a test of the truth-loving and liberal spirit, the anti-supernaturalist critics are generally sadly deficient in this important indication.

The relations of the new criticism to the supernatural element in the Jewish history differ somewhat from those to the gospel story, for the reason that the materials and data are relatively scanty, inaccessible, and uncertain. Sundry important questions

may be said to be still *sub judice*, and may remain for a long time undecided. A new and exciting interest has recently been aroused by the startling theories that have found a formal and earnest advocate in Professor Robertson Smith. At first thought it might seem that if the traditional views in respect to the history of the Levitical system and the authorship of parts of the Old Testament are to be disturbed so seriously as he and his teachers affirm, then the deeper and older foundations in Mosaism on which Christianity professes to stand must inevitably give way, and both Mosaism and Christianity as supernatural systems must be ingulfed in one yawning chasm of ruin. A second thought reminds us that the new theory seems to require more than any other a continually acknowledged and ever present supernatural agency with a people whose institutions were capable of constant expansion. The sudden enlargement of a ritual system already established with a significance so spiritual, and its acceptance by the people at a time too when their spiritual insight was rapidly advancing, can be accounted for most satisfactorily by the presence of the prophetic office and of prophetic authority. But whatever may have been the relations of the prophets to the priesthood, one thing is certain—that the more we study the past of the Hebrew nation, and compare it with that of any other, the more conspicuously do Moses and Elijah, Abraham and David, Isaiah and Ezekiel, stand forth as qualified and commissioned by supernatural gifts, and so qualified as to speak in the name of God to the men of their times and to the men of all times. What their message was to their own people, and what through them it is to us, may be questions which it is not always easy for us to answer in detail. Some of these questions it may not be possible for us to answer at all, and yet in the light of modern criticism we may hold with firmer faith than ever before that the God who "of old time spoke unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners" is the same God who "at the end of these days hath spoken with us in his Son."

The special researches which are now prosecuted with such zeal into the documents which have always been and still continue to be the treasure and the pride of the Jewish people all serve to establish their high antiquity. The discovery of other

documents, whether unrolled from mummies or unearthed from tablets of clay, testify to a similarity between traditions or possible truth, and connect the Hebrew people with their contemporaries by manifold relations which glow with manifested reality. They attest the high antiquity of the Hebrew story and its essential truth in ways and by evidence which could never be so well appreciated as now. Whatever else is uncertain, of one thing we may be confident, and that is that the existence of the Hebrew nation, with their conception of Jehovah as their national God—while yet in a real and spiritual sense he was the rightful tho the rejected sovereign of other nations—with their belief in his miraculous presence and constant faithfulness, with their ritual, their sacrifices, and their hopes, with their history of backsliding and recovery, can be in no way so satisfactorily explained to any man who believes the supernatural agency of God to be possible as by the belief that God was supernaturally present with Israel in fact. To this conclusion we believe that all critics and students of history must sooner or later come. Thither the stream of tendency must bring them all at last, and with them the consenting judgment and the warm approval of all intelligent and right-thinking men who do not profess to be scholars, but who are yet competent to understand and sympathize with any great movement in the world's thinking and feeling.

V. These considerations very naturally suggest the inquiry, What evidence is furnished by the *culture* and *literature* of the times in respect to the relative strength or weakness of the believing spirit, and the consequent energy and prospects of faith in Christianity and in Christ? We include under literature all those intellectual products that by their perfection of form, their attractiveness to the imagination, and their popular character, are fitted to move and sway the minds and hearts of the more or less cultured part of the community. The literature of a period is in one sense the reflex of its beliefs and its sentiments, representing as it does all its phases of activity from its profoundest reflection up to any sparkling play of wit or trivial sally of humor. In a most important sense, by its reacting force it forms and fixes the principles of the times,

as it expresses them in its pithy utterances, holds them by its arguments, pictures them in its imagery, makes them brilliant by its wit, or burns them into the heart by its eloquence. What Plutarch in a memorable utterance says of poetry is eminently true of literature, that "it mediates between philosophy and life," if we understand by philosophy the solid convictions of the schools, and by life the practical sentiments and impulses that control the mass of the community. Literature in these times has a wider field of activity than ever, and more properly assumes to be representative of our general and pervasive life. The time was when it was a separate estate, more or less an independent and lawless power, which tyrannized over the consciences and tastes, and arrayed its independent energies against the church, the state, and whatever of morality or prescription was dependent on either. For this reason literature is thought by many to be the natural and necessary foe of faith and spirituality, and in its very genius to be necessarily destructive. The self-called wits of the previous generations in England are conceived to have been freethinkers of necessity for no other reason than that the Christianity of the church was an inviting target for their wit and ribaldry. The enormous destructive power which was wielded by the literary class in France cannot easily be over-estimated. Literature is not, however, necessarily destructive or unbelieving, especially in countries in which thought is free and the expression of it is untrammelled, and letters are at once the arena and the instrument for those assaults and defences of which opposing parties avail themselves. In the earlier days of England's better life literature was believing and devout, for the reason that the best thought and feeling glowed with such intensity that it could not but find expression in the highest forms; and hence literature, tho often sensuous and passionately free of speech, was characteristically religious. When the faith of England was less fervent and her morals became rotten, poetry and criticism could not but emit a rank and noisome odor. When religion revived again, the modern school of poetry revived with it, criticism became more self-respecting and considerate, and philosophy more profound and religious. Whatever may be said of the literature of the present generation, it cannot be

justly charged with indecency or indecorum of sentiment, with flippant scepticism or rude blasphemy of speech. Its moral sympathies are elevated, and its language is studiously decorous and reverential. The spiritual truths which faith accepts and the faith which warmly cleaves to them are honored with studious respect. The Christian motives, the Christian life, the characteristically Christian virtues, are warmly recognized as the highest and purest of all human experiences, the nearest real approximations to the ideals of ethical and spiritual realization. It is not too much to say also that the philosophy, the history, the poetry, and the criticism of the present era are to a large extent positively and avowedly Christian.

If we exclude science and philosophy, as we properly may, we find that the only considerable exception to the prevailingly Christian character of English literature is its criticism. The age itself is characteristically critical in all its activities, and it ought to occasion no surprise that its critics by profession should often be questioning and sometimes sceptical; nor indeed that the attitude of those writers who study point and effectiveness should often be negative and even sarcastic with respect to a positive Christian faith and an earnest religious life. It is an age in which every received tradition, every positive principle, every fashion and maxim even, must be justified by a fresh analysis of its nature and a review of the grounds on which it stands. The verities of conscience and of faith on the one hand, by their very nature as fundamental and authoritative, and of individual conviction on the other, not only challenge but demand fresh investigation from every man who thinks.

It may be questioned, however, whether these critics by profession and occupation always represent the deliberate convictions of the ablest men even of a critical generation. Not a few of the ablest and most active are young men, whom marriage and a profession will bring into closer fellowship with facts and truths which experience only can enable them justly to measure and estimate. Very many of the veterans who are justly honored as foremost among critics have drifted into a literary career as a consequence of the morbid sensitiveness which disqualified them for being actors in life and forced them

to be lookers-on with the consequent defects of mere spectators upon a drama which demands faith in reality at every turn, whether for the present or the future; whether the action turns upon prudence or duty or courage or fidelity or prayer or hope. Men who fling themselves out of the ring from any confessed distaste or disqualification are not likely to be the best judges or umpires of the forces that are destined to win in any battle. Emerson, Carlyle, Clough, Matthew Arnold, Leslie Stephen, J. A. Froude, F. W. Newman, and W. R. Greg are all examples of men who take a more or less negative attitude with respect to the Christian history, the Christian verities, and the Christian affections. Their critical negations fairly and truly represent, so far as they themselves are concerned, that collapse of faith which some of them so eloquently portray and even passionately and pitifully deplore. That in speaking for themselves they also speak for others, and so far represent a distinct phase of modern thought and especially of our cultured life, cannot be questioned. That this scepticism is real and fundamental and most tenacious, we cannot doubt and do not care to deny. But we find reason to believe that it is not so hopelessly negative as the painful confessions and the occasional caustic and contemptuous denials of some writers would seem to imply. However much of commonly received Christian truth these men fail to accept, they show most unmistakably that there is very much to which either as symbol or fact they most tenaciously cleave, and to which they attach a serious significance—so serious that without it the earth would be to them a waste, life a dream, and man a contemptible enigma. While the Christian theology, the Christian church, and the Christian emotions and activities awaken but feeble responses of sympathy, the Christian patience and self-denial and reverence and self-control are more than ever admired; they are even worshipped—sometimes, it would almost seem, in place of the Christ who first exemplified and inspired them. What does all this signify except that the best ideal of what a Christianized humanity should become has taken too strong a hold of the best side of modern criticism ever to be eradicated by any influence, whether open or subtle, whether direct or indirect? Perhaps this critical scepticism is but a one-sided manifestation of that scrupulous caution in judging

of evidence which the Christian love of truth originally inspired. Possibly this want of sympathy with the ordinary manifestations of Christian life is largely and justly to be ascribed to the glaring inconsistencies and defects of this life as reflected in the minds of keen-eyed and unsympathizing observers. The distorted and grotesque images of the Christian life which are reflected by this sensitive idealism, when tested by what it ought to be, may incapacitate these critics from candidly judging what it is in fact. The church itself, with all its zeal and saintliness, is by no means so pure or so wise in its earthly manifestations of the divine life as not to give abundant occasion for the sharpest criticism on the part of its sympathizing friends. It is not surprising that its less sympathetic observers, especially those who are critics by occupation, should at times flood it with showers of sparkling satire. And yet were not its faith and life a positive and an augmenting power its defects and inconsistencies would attract less attention and awaken a feebler criticism.

VI. This brings us to the very portals of the church itself, and bids us look into the inner sanctuary, and ask with somewhat fearful solicitude whether faith glows or smoulders upon the altars within, well knowing that so will faith weaken or prevail in every other department of human activity. We find to our surprise that in the judgment of not a few the saddest indication of a hopeless collapse of faith is discerned by many in a general weakening of orthodoxy among so-called Christian believers. The creeds which were once held as so sacred are now freely if not profanely criticised. Some of the discriminations and watchwords of the Protestant theology are resolved into the traditions of the scholastic theology or the compromises of practised dialecticians. Christian doctrines that are rightly regarded as fundamental are propounded in novel phraseology, are explained by new analogies, and are defended by new proof-texts. With some of these texts, which have been cited without question for generations, the new exegesis deals in merciless forgetfulness that they have been made sacred by the associations of centuries in the catechism and the pulpit. Nay, logical theology itself and creed-making are publicly denounced

as a device of the devil, and one form of stating the Christian faith is declared to be as good as another where all are necessarily so imperfect and one-sided.

It is not easy to prove to a certain class of alarmists that even these extravagant speeches are only the foam of a great movement of Christian thinking which bodes good rather than evil to Christian theology and Christian catholicity. It is difficult to allay the honest fears of men who cannot distinguish between that reflective or reasoned statement of religious truth which must characterize every formulated creed and school theology, from those picturesque and emotional expressions of religious truth, largely in popular language, with which the Scriptures abound. Even if this difference can be made clear, it is not easy to demonstrate that with the revolution in the principles and rules of exegesis, together with what is almost a revolution in the principles of religious philosophy, the old methods of handling proof-texts and of translating their import into catechetical and theological propositions must be modified in some essential particulars. And yet the conviction of this necessity is confessed by the deeds if not in the words of the majority of Protestant theologians now living. Most of them, certainly all who have the ear of their generation, whether consciously or unconsciously, whether avowedly or disavowedly, use proof-texts in a manner that differs materially from the traditions of other generations. They accept if they do not acknowledge the principle that the Christian theology of an age must be more or less manifestly the product of its philosophy conjoined with its scientific interpretation of proof-texts. These principles are as certain to gain ground as Christian and philosophic truth are certain to triumph. So fast and so far as they prevail they must essentially modify the unquestioned authority of traditional creeds and formulated theological systems. The faith of the church of the remote future and of the near present may be less dogmatic and unquestioning than formerly, but it may be more discriminating, catholic, and devout. While we are not so simple as not to be fully aware that faith in Christ as a Person involves faith in a possible creed and a reasoned and formulated theology, we contend that the one may exist without the development of the other, and that under

certain circumstances faith in Christ and in Christian truth may increase in proportion as zeal for a system or a creed declines. While it is certain that when faith in Christ declines or vanishes faith in Christian creeds and theologies must go with it, the converse is not necessarily true.

This increased catholicity, or it may be indifference, of Christian believers in respect to theological definitions and controversies is not necessarily an indication of diminished loyalty to Christian truth or to the great teacher of the Christian church. It may, and to a large extent we think it does, arise from a profounder reverence for his majesty, a more loving gratitude for his mercy, and a firmer faith in the power of his life and death. The presence of these practical emotions may show that the faith of the church is the more tenacious and fervent with respect to what it holds just in proportion as it thinks less of many of the propositions or catchwords which have been flaunted so conspicuously on the banners of the church militant, or have been shouted from the throats of its brazen-voiced leaders. It does not necessarily follow because the five points of Calvinism are made less of than formerly by those who call themselves Calvinists, or because the counter propositions of this or that school of Arminians are less confidently asserted as containing the last and best words of Christian truth, or because questions of church organization or church millinery or church ritualism are now esteemed of less vital importance than formerly—it does not follow from all this that faith in whatever truth commends God's authority or his love, or in the order and decency of worship as of supreme importance, is weaker now than it was two generations ago. We ought to say more than this. We ought positively to affirm what every enlightened philosopher or theologian knows and believes in his heart of hearts, that the methods of conceiving, stating, and defending theological truth have immensely improved in the last two generations; that as theology has become more modest and less dogmatical it has become immeasurably more confident and strong; that what it may have conceded as uncertain, and as possibly incapable of positive definition or argument, has been more than supplied by what it can affirm with augmented confidence and urge upon the conscience and heart with fearless and rational positiveness.

Moreover, we also believe that with all the flippancy and scepticism of the public mind in respect to much that is asserted as Christian and vital truth, there was never a time in which the defenders of Christian supernaturalism, who are competent and willing to discriminate between strong and weak arguments, are certain to meet with a more ready response in the understanding and hearts of intelligent men. It is true that formal and traditional arguments pass for little in these days. The droning repetition of old statements of doctrine in which there is no fresh and modern life is listened to with indifference and dismissed with contempt. The platitudes of unctuous exhortation are stale, flat, and unprofitable. The repetitions of the so-called evidences may be as dry as remainder biscuit, but the arguments of an earnest believer, and, above all, the life of a man or woman of fervent faith, never had greater power to waken trains of convincing reasoning and to urge fervent appeals than at the present moment.

VII. Our argument had brought us within the portals of the church, and led us to inquire whether faith was still glowing upon its altars. We had almost forgotten that faith by its very nature cannot be limited to priests and teachers, but in its very nature must live or die in the hearts of the mass of living worshippers. The question whether faith is suffering a fatal collapse cannot be answered till we have discovered how far and with what energy it animates and directs the life of the Christian church. We have examined the atheistic and agnostic science and philosophy, the new-fangled ethics, the learned and the literary criticism, and the shifting theology of our times, in order that we might ascertain how far faith may have relatively declined, and what are the signs of its dissolution or it may be of its revival. It remains for us to inquire what indications in respect to its recovery or decline are furnished by the religious life of Christendom. Our readers will hardly suspect us of attaching too little importance to the influence of speculative opinions and literary associations. But while these react with enormous power on the thinking and feeling of every generation, they themselves are to a large extent the creations of the spiritual and ethical life of a generation. The great

thinkers and writers of every time were each trained in a home where faith glowed or smouldered, where God was worshipped or was dishonored, in a community where Christian duty and inspiration were honored or scorned, at a school or university where science and letters fostered or sneered at faith and devotion, and by teachers who honored or denied God and Christ. The lives of Kant and Schleiermacher, of Voltaire and Rousseau, of Mill and Parker, show that those speculative opinions of theirs which moulded the opinions of one or more generations were themselves largely determined by their personal spiritual and ethical life.

If the leaders of thought often determine what the people believe, the faith of the people is as often expressed in what their leaders teach. Faith can never die out of the science, the philosophy, the ethics, and the literature of a people so long as faith is cherished in their hearts and rules in their homes. If we are to find decisive indications of a popular collapse of faith, we must find them in a decline in the spiritual and ethical life of the Christian church, and in the reflex of this decline in the waning respect of the community for sincere and earnest Christian living and sacrifice. We couple the two together, for we shall always find the two together so soon as the partisan or persecuting age has gone by. What then shall we say of the Christian life at present as an evidence of the earnestness of the faith beneath? and what of the heartfelt respect for Christian earnestness as a pervasive impulse in the community?

First, what is the relative tone and strength of the Christian life of the present day? Many things may be said, and said truly, in criticism and satire of its shallowness and its inconsistencies, of its fickleness and its mistakes, of the want of judgment in its zeal and of the want of zeal with its judgment, of its pitiful lack of practical wisdom, and its more pitiful lack of Christian simplicity. The unsympathizing critic has reason to be offended if not disgusted at times at the strange motley of this-worldliness and other-wordliness which it wears, at the flashy character of its excitements and the more flashy character of its exhorters and pulpit mountebanks. But suppose we look beneath and ask ourselves about the patient continuance in well-doing of the multitudes who seek for glory, honor, and immor-

tality in a secret life that is hid with Christ in God, or endeavor to do justice to the purified atmosphere of those thousands of humble but happy Christian homes, in which Christ is honored as supreme, and is never forgotten by day or night however hard and obscure may be the lot in life; or limited the sphere of thought or action. It would not be easy to compute the "potential energy" which slumbers in the faith of these myriads of believing souls, but which now and then makes itself felt when a time of stress comes upon the land. Let it be granted that the forms of its acting may occasionally reveal narrowness and ignorance, and that with the pure fire of genuine love there may be mingled much strange fire of fanaticism and folly. All that we are concerned to know is whether the genuine faith of men is dead or dying. In the midst of manifest uncertainty and fickleness of opinion, do the men who profess to believe in God and immortality and the Gospel believe less firmly than in former times? If they are less positive in respect to many points, do they hold less confidently and warmly to the truths in which a man cares to live and to die? Let the answer be found in the practical fruits of Christian living which abound in the individual and social life of the present day, and which are confessedly the products of faith in a present and living Christ. After all the concessions which we must make in respect to the unwisdom and fickleness of the external forms of Christian living, we are constrained to say that there was never a time when faith in Christ and in distinctively Christian truth was so energetic a force in individual and social life as it is at the present moment. Its energy was never so great, its modes of action were never so varied, its penetrating and recreating force was never so widely felt, never so transforming and so all-subduing, as at this moment, and its application to the complex relations of human activity in individual and social life was never so manifold and so beneficent.

And what is thought and felt in respect to the energy and earnestness of this faith by those lookers-on who are severe and not always sympathizing witnesses? There is plenty of satire for its follies and mistakes, often well deserved; there is keen distrust of its overweening pretensions; there is many a secret joke if not an open rebuke at its sharp practices; there is much severe

and sometimes uncharitable questioning of the motives and professions of inconsistent zealots. There is much honest and more affected wonder that the church is not more unworldly by men who profess no other godliness for themselves than the worship of gain. But it is very rare that in any community, however small, there are not found a few men and women who are acknowledged to be worthy Christian disciples, and whose worth enforces respect for the faith which they profess. We do not deny that there are points of serious weakness in the Christian life at the present day, points of weakness which but few are quick to discern or care to criticise. In this country and in all countries these are largely incident to the rapid material developments of the times, and the kind of individual and social culture which must attend such a growth. This material growth has also been attended by the development of science, inventive arts, and literary tastes at even a more rapid pace, which has partially withdrawn the allegiance of many from spiritual aims and the higher ends and types of life. With the development of physical science, tho in no sense as its legitimate effect, a shallow materialism, a pretentious and more superficial atheism, a still more shallow ethics, have made more or less headway, all of which have weakened the legitimate force of the higher truths, and have tended to satisfy men with thoughts and cares for the present life. That the Christian church has so well maintained its allegiance to its Master under temptations so manifold and so dazzling is perhaps more surprising than that it has yielded so much to the spirit of the times.

But let it be granted that the Christian church remains true to its Master and retains much of the freshness of its faith and zeal; does it follow that with the decay of faith among men of letters and its collapse with men of science it will not sooner or later also fail among the intelligent and reflecting in common life? How can it be reasoned that the natural originators and directors of thought shall not finally control the opinions of all classes, and so the old faith shall not gradually die out from root to branch of the intelligent life of the community? How can it be contrarywise that the sturdy or the quickened faith of the masses of men shall make itself felt by way of reaction against the dicta of scientific associations and metaphysical dogmatists

and literary critics? Can faith in these days make headway against reason, and especially against the instructed reason of positive science and the illuminated time-spirit? These questions are often asked, and they admit and require a distinct and positive answer.

The lines of evidence and argument which are decisive of the great truths with which faith need concern itself are equally open to all men who are capable of cool reflection. Science often hinders rather than helps to the exercise of such reflection by limiting the attention to special activities and special relations, by the glare and bewilderment of brilliant discoveries, by the narrow conceit of independence or novelty of opinion, and by the excitement attendant upon the reception of a paradoxical theory. The activity of its defenders and the novelty of its subject-matter may so preoccupy the mind as to shut out those familiar relations which would decide the argument with a simpler and more limited understanding. Faith, so far as it is an intellectual process, being when philosophically conceived either an intuitive or inductive act upon moral or spiritual data, requires concentrated attention to a few comprehensive but easily apprehensible facts and relations. These facts and relations are given, or rather they are offered, to every man's experience and to every man's reflection. They concern God, duty, immortality, personality, moral perfection, sin, guilt, redemption, on the one hand, and the acts and manifestations of God in providence and human history which are suited to man's condition. The man in common life is tempted only to ridicule the atheism of Physicus, and having no special reverence for authority, he pronounces positively, "The fool hath said in his heart, No God." He smiles at the laborious piety of Mr. Spencer in charging impiety upon the man who thinks of God as a Father, and professes to know that he may worship Him; for to him personality is a very positive and dignified fact, and he cannot even understand what Mr. Spencer means. The new ethics he practically rejects and abhors, because he has rights to defend and sacred duties to perform, and a private and family and social life to live, with its manifold obligations and its needed laws and restraints. His difficulties about the supernatural were all settled when he had occasion to use prayer or to trust in the guidance of Providence. A rev-

elation in which there is no supernatural would be improbable and one-sided to him—too vapid and mean either to live or die by. Critical difficulties about the Old Testament or the New, and the solutions of them, he leaves to scholars to decide, having ample warrant for all which, as a believer in Christ, he is called to accept. Having decisive reasons for all that he is called on or able to believe, his faith is completely rational.

He may be perplexed and disturbed by what he hears and reads of scientific atheism and philosophical naturalism, but if he falls back upon what he believes, and confines his attention to this and the reasons for holding it, his faith is unmoved, and out of a convinced understanding he fights the battle of life, by faith in his Divine Master. More than this: he helps to keep faith alive on the earth, as he gives his testimony to that truth of which he has become doubly convinced by the most satisfactory of all trials, the trial of personal experience, the trial of a life that is hidden with Christ in God, and often the trial of a death which is anticipated and overcome by faith.

The strength of faith in any period and in any community depends on the number of individual souls who accept these truths as practical principles and the energy with which their inner and outer life are controlled by them. Whether the argument in respect to the other questions and lines of thought seems to be the stronger or weaker, or whether fewer or more individuals take the unbelieving or the believing side, so long as earnest men believe the supernatural Christ with rational conviction induced by moral and spiritual evidence, and act out their faith in energetic and zealous Christian living, faith can never collapse. It is then in this direction that the activities of all believing men should be turned to gain strength and prevalence for their practical convictions on the broad and obvious grounds by which Christianity must stand or fall. It is in this sense that the truth is always so significant, and pre-eminently at the present time, that Christianity is not a philosophy, nor a history, nor a theology, but a Life. It is because Christianity is attacked from so many quarters, and what is assumed to be essential in it is assailed with so much zeal and plausibility on grounds that are familiar to but few, that these strong arguments should be brought into the foreground, while those which are lim-

ited to specialists or are of inferior significance should be occasionally or sparingly used. It were better to abandon every outwork and redoubt, even the strongest and most capable of successful defence, than to be driven out of a single position. The loss of a weak position is nothing, but the disgrace of not having known it to be defenceless is injurious to any cause. The real weakness of the Christian cause as it is often defended lies in the ignorance on the part of its friends of the real strength of the arguments by which it stands. Whether still other sharp lessons of temporary defeat or disgrace shall be needed to enforce wiser judgments remains to be proved. While the defenders of the Christian faith, as we have argued, have no reason for fear, or even for misgiving, they have no occasion for bravado. The frequency with which these obvious precepts of wisdom have often been disregarded gives point and emphasis to the remark that one of the most convincing proofs of the divine authority of Christianity is that it has survived so long in spite of its defenders.

NOAH PORTER.